For Whom Terror Works

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Abstract

Empirical studies have shown that terrorists' policy goals are rarely achieved, leading some to conclude that terrorism doesn't work. We theorize that terrorism works, but for its supporters rather than for the terrorists themselves. Because supporters are willing to contribute resources to a terrorist organization, thereby increasing the terrorist organization's ability to launch attacks, this will coerce the targeted government to revise its policies in accordance with the supporters' preferences. Targeted governments respond with concessions in order to erode support and thereby render the terrorists easier to defeat. Support can be rational even when, as is empirically likely, supporters' ideal policies are closer to those of the government than to those of the terrorists. We examine six campaigns generally regarded as unambiguous failures of terrorism. For each, we show that governments made concessions that placated the supporters but not the terrorists, and that this was followed by successful suppression of the weakened terrorists.

1   Introduction

Terrorism doesn't work. Or at least, that is the conclusion drawn from comparing the stated demands of terrorist organizations to the outcomes of their violent campaigns: those demands are almost never met (Abrahms, 2006a, 2012; Jones and Libicki, 2008; Krause, 2013). In case after case, many terrorists end up dead or in prison, their organizations are crushed by the targeted government or at least suppressed to the point of being unable to carry out many attacks, and their manifestos are reduced to hopeless wish lists.

Why would anyone participate in an activity with such a high risk of death and such a low chance of success? Scholars have resorted to a variety of conjectures in response to this puzzle. Perhaps terrorists mistakenly believe they have a high probability of success, or instead believe that even failure will be divinely rewarded. Maybe terrorists seek social solidarity over political goals (Abrahms, 2008) or organizational over strategic success (Krause, 2013). Or they might simply be irrational owing to the pathology of groupthink (Tsintsadze-Maass and Maass, 2014) or to principal-agent problems that lead the rank-and-file of militant organizations to attack civilians (Abrahms and Potter, 2015).

We present an alternative view, formalized in a bargaining model of conflict among a terrorist organization (TO), its support base, and a government targeted by the terrorists. We conceptualize a terrorist organization as an agent, working at the behest of a base of supporters, who are not themselves terrorists or members of the TO, that forms the principal. This base may be comprised of domestic constituents of the targeted government, a relevant diaspora, or a foreign state, and it provides the resources the terrorist organization needs to carry out its campaign, including funds, recruits, weapons, sanctuary, and legitimacy.

In our model, the support base and the targeted government bargain over the policies set by the government on which they disagree. The support base can choose to offer support to the terrorist organization, thereby enabling and motivating it to conduct attacks against the government. These attacks might result in the overthrow of the government and its

replacement by the terrorist organization, but even if they do not, they impose costs on the terrorists, the government, and the support base. The targeted government therefore anticipates this possibility in setting its policies.

Individuals join the TO and conduct attacks because their efforts are compensated by the TO's base of supporters. Naturally, people with the most radical opinions are more likely to join, and might choose to fight even though the chance of victory is low. But many others join because they doing so brings money and status from the base of supporters. This rationalizes joining and participating in terrorism.

Supporters contribute to the TO in order to encourage it to conduct attacks because they anticipate this will lead to concessions from the government. They avoid the danger and cost of doing the fighting themselves, but nonetheless can use their support of the TO to exert leverage on the targeted government. We show that supporters can rationally do so even in situations where supporters would actually prefer the government's policy in the status quo to the TO's ideal policy.

The targeted government makes changes to its policy not to pacify the TO but to placate its supporters. By giving them at least some of what they want, the government can cause them to lessen or end their support for the TO, undermining the TO's ability to conduct attacks and making it easier for the government to suppress the TO.

In effect, the support base employs the terrorist organization as a kind of coercive apparatus, much as a government utilizes its military. In this view, whether the terrorists achieve their stated goals is a potentially misleading answer to the question of whether terrorism works, in much the same way as whether an infantry division achieves its objectives would not necessarily tell us whether war works. Instead, this view would have us ask whether the supporters of the terrorist organization achieve their goals, something that might happen even if the terrorists themselves are decisively defeated.

If our view is right, then terrorism "works" for its supporters, in that it brings desired conces-

sions from the government, but not for the actual terrorists, who are merely the instrument for bringing those concessions about. The participation of the terrorists is rationalized by the support they receive, and this support is in turn rationalized by the anticipated concessions from the government.

To test our theory, we turn to six terrorist campaigns that scholars seem to agree are examples of terrorism not working, in the sense that the TO did not achieve most of its stated goals. The six are Al Qaeda, the Egyptian Islamic Group (EIG), Hamas, Hezbollah, the Provisional Irish Republican Army (IRA), and the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE). Precisely because these are cases in which terrorism clearly did not work for the terrorists, they provide difficult but compelling cases on which to test our theory. After all, in cases where the terrorists got what they wanted, it would be unsurprising to find that the spoils were shared with their supporters. However, if we find—as we do—that cases where the terrorists themselves failed miserably still feature their supporters getting what they want, it is more convincing evidence for our theory.

For each case, we identify the relevant base of supporters and use available opinion polling and expert analyses to characterize its desired outcome. We investigate whether the targeted government responded to terrorism with policy concessions and whether these were aimed at undermining support for the TO among its base of supporters rather than individuals in the TO, as our theory predicts. If such concessions are made, we look to see whether support for the TO declined in response and whether the TO subsequently split, faded away, or was defeated by the targeted government.

In all six cases, we find evidence consistent with our theory. Terrorism worked for its supporters, in that targeted governments changed their policies in ways favorable to these supporters, who then reduced their support for terrorism. Facing this loss of support, most of the terrorist organizations suffered a bad outcome: some fractured into weaker splinter groups, others were defeated by the target government, still others faded away into political

irrelevance. Those that survived and remained politically relevant did so only by shifting to relying heavily on a different support base.

Our work can be thought of as a generalization of the literature on foreign sponsorship of terrorism (or rebellion), which also views the militant organization as an agent and the foreign state as the principal. Salehyan (2008, 2010); Salehyan *et al.* (2011) treat sponsorship as a substitute for war between the foreign sponsor and the targeted government. Bapat (2006); Salehyan *et al.* (2014) argue that the sponsor can induce the militant organization to accept a peace settlement or refrain from committing atrocities. Bapat (2012, 2014); Bapat and Zeigler (2016) show that sponsorship can induce bargaining failure and lead to war between the sponsor and target. Qiu (2020); Schram (2021) formalize mechanisms wherein sponsorship weakens the target government relative to the sponsor by forcing the target to focus military resources on the militant organization rather than the sponsor.

We extend this principal-agent view of foreign sponsorship to any base of support for terrorism, including the domestic constituencies that are observed for many terrorist organizations. We show that, at least judged from the perspective of those domestic constituencies, terrorism works in that it coerces the target government into making favorable policy concessions. In our model, terrorism does not actually occur, because in equilibrium the government anticipates the possibility of terrorist attacks and chooses a policy that is just enough to appease the base of potential supporters. This simple version of the model suffices to demonstrate how the supporters can use the threat of terrorism to exert leverage over the government's choice of policy, which is our primary concern since it is this that determines whether terrorism works for the supporters.

However, it is easy to imagine an extension in which the support base has private information about its resolve to change government policy. Under certain conditions, in equilibrium the government would initially set an uncompromising policy in order to screen low-resolve supporters. If the support base had high resolve, it would offer support to the terrorist

organization and attacks would occur, causing the government to revise its estimate of the base's resolve upward and adopt a more conciliatory policy. (We intend to pursue this extension to the current model in subsequent drafts.)

2 Model

2.1 Actors

There is a violent extremist organization (denoted V), a Government (denoted G), and a Sponsor (denoted S). Each actor has an ideal point over the policy space characterized by parameter χ_i. We will assume $\chi_G = 0$, $\chi_S < \frac{1}{2}$, and $\chi_V \geq 1$, and that each actor has linear loss utility functions. Together, consistent with empirical observations, this implies that the Sponsor has closer preferences to the Government than to the VEO.

2.2 Game Order

The game is as follows:

1. Period $t = 1$ begins.

2. G fixes policy $x_t \geq 0$.

3. S observes x_t and decides whether to fund the VEO in period t or not. This choice is denoted by selecting some $f_t \geq 0$, with $f_t = 0$ denoting not funding. S incurs costs $C(f_t)$ for funding V, where C is increasing in f_t.

4. V observes x_t and receives the funding, and then V chooses whether to attack G or not. If V does not attack G, the game moves to (5). If V does attack, G "wins" in period t with probability $P(f_t)$ (where $P : \mathbb{R}_+ \to (0, 1)$) and V wins with probability $1 - P(f_t)$. $P(\cdot)$ is continuous and weakly decreasing in f_t. When V attacks, G and V incur per-period costs $c_G \geq 0$ and $c_V \geq 0$ (respectively). If G wins, the game proceeds

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to (5). If V wins, the game does not proceed to (5), and V can set the policy to any $x_{t,V} \geq 0$ for period t and all future periods.

5. The game repeats starting at (2) and t is updated to $t = t+1$. Utilities are discounted by common rate $\delta \in (0,1)$.

2.3 Utilities

Suppose in period t G sets policy x_t, S offers funding f_t to V, and V does not attack. The per-period payoffs are as follows.

$$u_G = - x_t$$
$$u_S = - |\chi_S - x_t| - C(f_t)$$
$$u_V = - |\chi_V - x_t|$$

Now suppose V doesn't attack in every period. The total payoffs for the game are

$$U_G = \sum_{t=1}^{\infty} -\delta^{t-1} x_t$$
$$U_S = \sum_{t=1}^{\infty} -\delta^{t-1} \left(|\chi_S - x_t| - C(f_t) \right)$$
$$U_V = \sum_{t=1}^{\infty} -\delta^{t-1} |\chi_V - x_t|$$

Finally, suppose in period $t = k > 1$, V attacks for one period. The expected utilities are

$$U_G = \sum_{t=1}^{k-1} \left[-\delta^{t-1} x_t \right] - \delta^{k-1} \left(P(f_k) x_k + (1 - P(f_k)) \sum_{t=k}^{\infty} \left[\delta^{t-k} x_{t,V} \right] + c_G \right) - P(f_k) \sum_{t=k+1}^{\infty} \left[\delta^{t-1} x_t \right]$$

$$U_S = \sum_{t=1}^{k-1} \left[-\delta^{t-1} \left(|\chi_S - x_t| + C(f_t) \right) \right] - \delta^{k-1} \left(P(f_k) |\chi_S - x_k| + (1 - P(f_k)) \sum_{t=k}^{\infty} \left[\delta^{t-k} |x_{t,V} - \chi_S| \right] + C(f_k) \right)$$

$$- P(f_k) \sum_{t=k+1}^{\infty} \delta^{t-1} \left(|\chi_S - x_t| + C(f_t) \right)$$

$$U_V = \sum_{t=1}^{k-1} \left[-\delta^{t-1} |\chi_V - x_t| \right] - \delta^{k-1} \left(-P(f_k) |\chi_V - x_k| + (1 - P(f_k)) \left(\sum_{t=k+1}^{\infty} \left[-\delta^{t-1} |\chi_V - x_{t,V}| \right] \right) + c_V \right) - P(f_k) \sum_{t=k+1}^{\infty} \delta^{t-1} |\chi_V - x_t|$$

In periods 1 to $k - 1$, the utilities resemble the payoffs from V never attacking. When V attacks period k, it generates costs $-c_G$ and $-c_V$ for G and V (respectively).[1] Additionally, there is a $1 - P(f_k)$ likelihood that V wins, resets the current policy, and sets all future policies (captured in the $\sum_{t=k}^{\infty} \left[\delta^{t-k} x_{t,V} \right]$ term in G's utility function). With likelihood $P(f_k)$, G wins, the policy x_k remains in place, and the game proceeds with G setting the policy into perpetuity.

2.4   Some Comments on the Game

In our game, we assume that G could be destroyed by V, but not that V could be destroyed by G. For the dynamic that we are considering—a Sponsor channeling funds to some VEO that attacks the Government—it is plausible that, following a devastating attack by the Government, a VEO could reconstitute itself or that the Sponsor could find an alternate VEO to fund. In this regard, while the VEO is a utility maximizing decision maker, the VEO is also a tool that can be used and replaced by the Sponsor.[2]

This model does not consider the possibility that the Government and the Sponsor could go

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[1]The results do not change substantively if S also incurs a $-c_S$ cost, but if these $-c_S$ costs are too high, it further deters S from funding the VEO.

[2]We are developing an extension where the VEO can also be destroyed for all time. This adds little additional insight, but that game has the feature that sometimes the government would want to fight the VEO in order to wipe it out rather than deal with it in perpetuity.

to war. Essentially, the results below could be taken as a case when S does has high-enough costs of war and seeks an alternate route. Given that in the equilibrium above the Sponsor uses the threat of terrorism to be granted concessions and does not pay costs on-the-path, the Sponsor choosing to sponsor a rebel group over relying on war seems like a plausibly good option.

3 Assumptions and Equilibria

3.1 Verbal Discussion of Equilibria

Infinite horizon games often possess a broad set of equilibria. This model is no different, but we want to highlight two particularly focal subgame perfect equilibria.

The first equilibrium functions as a "Baseline Equilibrium," where the Sponsor does not play an active role on- or off-the-equilibrium path. In the Baseline Equilibrium, the Government and the VEO essentially negotiate as if the Sponsor is not present; the Government makes their optimal offer to the VEO,[3] and the (unfunded) VEO decides whether to fight or not based on the offer. Given this behavior by the Government and the VEO, the Sponsor has no incentive to fund the VEO. Because funding the VEO both (weakly) induces the VEO to attack and increases the likelihood with which the VEO wins, funding increases the odds that the VEO actually overthrows the Government, which is undesired by the Sponsor given our assumptions on the Sponsor's preferences being closer to the Government than the VEO.

The second equilibrium highlights the phenomena that we are trying to explain: the threat of third-party support to extremist groups can induce policy concessions by the Government to the Sponsor. In this regard, threats by the Sponsor can lead to improved outcomes relative to the outcomes in the Baseline. The existence of such an equilibrium suggests that these

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[3]This optimal offer will either be $x_t = 0$, which may induce the VEO to attack, or some other offer $x_t = x^V(0)$, where $x^V(0)$ is the smallest policy concession that will keep an unfunded VEO from attacking. This is discussed more in Subsection 3.2.

VEOs, while acting as strategic decision makers, can function as foreign policy tools.

We call this second equilibrium a "Full Concession Terror Threat Equilibrium." On the path, the Government makes policy concession $x_t = \chi_S$ for perpetuity,[4] the Sponsor does not fund $(f_t = 0)$ for perpetuity, and the VEO never attacks. The policy concessions here $x_t = \chi_S$ are better for the Sponsor than the policy chosen in the Baseline Equilibrium. The Full Concession Terror Threat Equilibrium is sustained in the following way. If the Government deviates to some offer lower than χ_S in period t, the Sponsor will enter a punishment phase where the Sponsor will fund the VEO to a level $\hat{f}(\chi_S) \geq 0$ for a single round and this will induce the VEO to attack. If the Sponsor does not uphold their punishment phase, the Government will ignore the Sponsor and will play their ideal policy position in perpetuity.[5] Based on the level of funding that the VEO receives, the VEO will attack when it is optimal to do so, and not attack when optimal to do so. Collectively, we will refer to this behavior as the "Full Concession Terror Threat Equilibrium," which will be formally defined below.

These equilibria strike us a fairly focal. In the Baseline Equilibrium, the game plays out as-if the Sponsor is not present or the Sponsor is very weak. In the Full Concession Terror Threat Equilibrium, the Sponsor is able to threaten the Government into giving the Sponsor exactly what they want. Naturally a continuum of equilibria exist in-between, where the Sponsor threatens the government into granting partial (rather than full) concessions. We consider these equilibria in the Appendix. While these equilibria are empirically useful in describing cases where Sponsors received partial concessions, these equilibria are technically more complicated, hence our decision to include them in the Appendix rather than the main paper.

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[4]A more general equilibrium can also exist where G makes "partial" concession $\hat{x} \in (0, \chi_S)$, but this added flexibility adds little new insight.

[5]If S does not uphold their punishment phase, the game reverts to the Baseline Equilibrium.

3.2 Assumptions

We only consider subgame perfect equilibria.

Assumption 1: *For any $x_t \in [0, \chi_S]$, there exists some f_t that will induce V to attack.*

Assumption 1 is needed for punishments to be possible. In our equilibrium, G deviating from some policy concession must be met with S funding V and V attacking. If for a given deviation no level of funding will ever result in V attacking, then this equilibrium is not possible. While this assumption is technical, it also relates to the scope of cases that we are considering; we are considering terror groups that, upon receiving lots of funding, would be willing to use that funding to attack.

Assumption 2: *We assume that $\frac{\chi_V(1-P(0))}{1-\delta P(0)} + \frac{c_G(1-\delta)}{1-\delta P(0)} + \frac{c_V(1-\delta)}{1-P(0)} - \chi_V \geq 0$ and $P(\hat{f}(\chi_S)) - 1 + \delta > 0$.*

The first part of Assumption 2 $\frac{\chi_V(1-P(0))}{1-\delta P(0)} + \frac{c_G(1-\delta)}{1-\delta P(0)} + \frac{c_V(1-\delta)}{1-P(0)} - \chi_V \geq 0$ implies that it is possible for G and V to strike a peaceful bargain absent the Sponsor's intervention.[6] The second part of Assumption 2 $P(\hat{f}(\chi_S)) - 1 + \delta > 0$ is needed for S to be willing to support an equilibrium with sponsorship.

Assumption 3: *We assume that $C(f_t) = \kappa f_t$ with $\kappa > 0$.*

Assumption 3 is made for analytical ease.

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[6]It is useful describing how this assumption relates to the Baseline Equilibrium. In the Baseline Equilibrium, this assumption means it is best for G to set $x_t = x^V(0)$, where $x^V(0)$ is the offer that would result V not attack for a funding level of zero. If this assumption did not hold, then, in the Baseline Equilibrium, under the right parameters G would optimally set $x_t = 0$, which will induce V to fight.

3.3 Key Equilibria Values

Before introducing the equilibrium, we characterize several key values. All of these values are derived in the Appendix. We define value

$$x^V(f_t) = max \left\{ \chi_V - \frac{c_V(1-\delta)}{1 - P(f_t)}, 0 \right\},$$

which is, for a given funding level f_t, the offer that would either make V indifferent between attacking or not ($\chi_V - \frac{(1-\delta)c_V}{(1-P(f_t))} \geq 0$), or make V strictly prefer not attacking ($1 - \frac{(1-\delta)c_V}{(1-P(f_t))} < 0$).

Similarly, we can implicitly define $\hat{f}(x_t)$ as the funding level that satisfies

$$P(\hat{f}(x_t)) = 1 - \frac{c_V(1-\delta)}{\chi_V - x_t}$$

which is the funding level that would make V indifferent between attacking or not for a given x_t. $\hat{f}(x_t)$ exists for all $x_t \in [0, \chi_S]$ by Assumption 1 and because $P(\cdot)$ is continuous.

We also characterize $\hat{Q}(\hat{f}) = \frac{-\chi_S(1-\delta)-\delta(\chi_S-x^v(0))+(1-P(\hat{f}))\chi_V+(1-2P(\hat{f}))(-\chi_S)+C(\hat{f})(1-\delta)}{P(\hat{f})-1+\delta}$. With this value, we can define

$$x^S(\hat{f}) = \begin{cases} \hat{Q}(\hat{f}) & if \ x^V(0) \leq \hat{Q}(\hat{f}) \leq \chi_S, \ and \\ \emptyset & otherwise \end{cases}$$

as the smallest feasible policy concession that would result in S wanting to stay on the equilibrium path (including being willing to punish) for funding level $\hat{f}$.[7] There are two things to note here. First, if $\hat{Q}(\hat{f}) > \chi_S$ or $x^V(0) > \hat{Q}(\hat{f})$, then there is no possible policy concession that keeps S on the equilibrium path. Second, if $x^V(0) = x^S(\hat{f})$, S does not need to fund the terrorist group to generate any kind of policy concession.

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[7]Note that as $\hat{Q}(\hat{f})$ is defined, we assume that $\hat{f}$ is large enough to induce V to attack.

Finally, we define value

$$x^G(f_t) = min\left\{\chi_S, \frac{\chi_V(1 - P(\hat{f})) + c_G(1 - \delta)}{(1 - \delta P(\hat{f}))}\right\}$$

as the largest feasible offer that would keep G on the equilibrium path for given punishment f_t. This value is bounded above by χ_S because S would not want any offer $x_t > \chi_S$.

3.4   Equilibria

We first define the Baseline Equilibrium

Definition: *In the **Baseline Equilibrium**, on-the-path G sets policy $x_t = x^V(0)$, S does not fund, and V does not attack for all t.*

- *For all periods t, G fixes policy $x_t = x^V(0)$.*

- *For all periods t, S sets $f_t = 0$.*

- *For all periods t and funding levels f_t, if $x_t < \chi_V - \frac{c_V(1-\delta)}{1-P(f_t)}$ V will attack; if $x_t \geq \chi_V - \frac{c_V(1-\delta)}{1-P(f_t)}$, V will not attack. If V attacks and wins, then V will set $x_{t,V} = \chi_V$ for the current and all future periods.*

Based on the Assumptions above, this equilibrium will always exist. Because the equilibrium play here follows what is optimal treating each period as its own game, it is subgame perfect behavior to G to fix the smallest possible concession to V, for S not to fund, and for V not to attack.

Proposition 1: Let Assumptions (1)-(3) hold. A Baseline Equilibrium always exists.

Proof: See Appendix; all proofs of Propositions and Observations are in the Appendix.

Of course, the equilibrium of interest here is if the Sponsor can induce the Government to grant concessions by threatening to fund the VEO. We first define such an equilibrium.

*Definition: In the **Full Concession Terror Threat Equilibrium**, on-the-path, G sets policy $x_t = \chi_S$, S does not fund, and V does not attack for all t*

- *In period $t = 1$, G fixes policy $x_t = \chi_S$. In periods $t > 1$, the following is equilibrium play:*

  - *If G previously set $x_{t-1} \geq \chi_S$ and S previously set $f_{t-1} \geq 0$, then G will set $x_t = \chi_S$;*

  - *If G previously set $x_{t-1} < \chi_S$ and S previously set $f_{t-1} = \hat{f}(\chi_S)$, then G will set $x_t = \chi_S$;*

  - *If G previously set $x_{t-1} < \chi_S$ and S previously set $f_{t-1} < \hat{f}(\chi_S)$ or $f_{t-1} > \hat{f}(\chi_S)$, then G will set $x_t = x_V(0)$.*

- *For all periods t, if G sets $x_t \geq \chi_S$, then S sets $f_t = 0$; if G sets $x_t < \chi_S$, S will set $f_t = \hat{f}(\chi_S)$.*

- *For all periods t, if $f_t = 0$ and $x_t < \chi_V - \frac{c_V(1-\delta)}{1-P(0)}$, then V will attack; if $f_t = 0$ and $x_t \geq \chi_V - \frac{c_V(1-\delta)}{1-P(0)}$, then V will not attack; if $f_t > 0$ and $x_t \leq \chi_V - \frac{c_V(1-\delta)}{1-P(f_t)}$ then V will attack; if $f_t > 0$ and $x_t > \chi_V - \frac{c_V(1-\delta)}{1-P(f_t)}$, V will not attack. If V attacks and wins, then V will set $x_{t,V} = \chi_V$ for the current and all future periods.[8]*

And we can identify when this equilibrium exists.

Proposition 2: *Let Assumptions (1)-(3) hold. A Full Concession Terror Threat Equilibrium*

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[8]Note the strict and weak inequalities. It needs to be the case that for zero funding, G can fix an offer that will keep V from fighting. And, it needs to be that there is some defined level of funding that will induce V to attack.

exists if and only if

$$\chi_S > \chi_V - \frac{c_V(1-\delta)}{1 - P(0)}$$

$$\chi_S \geq \frac{-\chi_S(1-\delta) - \delta\left(\chi_S - x^v(0)\right) + \left(\frac{c_V(1-\delta)}{\chi_V - \chi_S}\right)\chi_V + \left(-1 + \frac{2c_V(1-\delta)}{\chi_V - \chi_S}\right)(-\chi_S) + \kappa\hat{f}(1-\delta)}{-\frac{c_V(1-\delta)}{\chi_V - \chi_S} + \delta}$$

and

$$\chi_S \leq \frac{\chi_V\left(\frac{c_V(1-\delta)}{\chi_V - \chi_S}\right) + c_G(1-\delta)}{1 - \delta\left(1 - \frac{c_V(1-\delta)}{\chi_V - \chi_S}\right)}.$$

The first condition in Proposition 2 implies that $\chi_S > x^V(0)$. Recall that χ_S here is the policy concession made to S (i.e. $x_t = \chi_S$ for all t). Were this not the case, then the sponsor isn't inducing any real change in equilibrium behavior beyond what would arise between V and G; in other words, S isn't actually using terrorism as a threat here. The second condition is that χ_S is greater than or equal to $x^S(\hat{f}(\hat{x}))$; if this were not the case, there would not exist any feasible offer that would keep S on the equilibrium path. Finally, the last condition implies that χ_S is less than $x^G(\hat{f}(\hat{x}))$ (inclusive). If $\chi_S > x^G(\hat{f}(\hat{x}))$, then G prefers selecting $x_t = 0$ for all t, knowing that this will result in S funding V and V attacking G.

What's critical about this equilibrium is that the Sponsor is able to utilize the VEO to extract full concessions from the Government. Naturally, partial concessions are also possible; in the Appendix, we offer a more general "Terror Threat Equilibrium" where, on-the-path, G sets some $x_t = \hat{x} \in (0, \chi_S]$ for all t.

4 Comparative Statics on the Full Concession Terror Threat Equilibrium

For this equilibrium analysis, we highlight four Observations.

Observation 1 (For Whom Terror Works): *The Full Concession Terror threat Equilibrium can induce concessions towards the Sponsor's ideal point.*

This observation is straightforward. In the baseline equilibrium, the government sets $x_t = x^V(0_t) = max\left\{\chi_V - \frac{c_V(1-\delta)}{1-P(0)}, 0\right\}$. By Proposition 2 (or based on how we define χ_S), this value is less than χ_S. Verbally, if a Full Concession Terror Threat Equilibrium exists and is played, then the Government is staking policy positions that are better for the Sponsor relative to the Baseline Equilibrium. This confirms of theoretical expectations: here the threat of funding terror groups can generate policy concessions by the Government.

Observation 2 (Anti-Ally Principle): *In the Full Concession Terror threat Equilibrium, increasing χ_V could strengthen or weaken the necessary conditions for a Full Concession Terror Threat Equilibrium.*

Observation 2 puts forward a potentially counterintuitive finding. In most principal agent settings, we anticipate an "ally-principle" result, where the principal prefers agents whose preferences are more aligned with their own preferences. However, in treating the Sponsor as the principal and the VEO as the agent, the ally-principle does not always hold in our model. As χ_V increases, the VEO's ideal point moves away from the Sponsor's ideal point. This has several distinct effects, but for now, consider the two effects this has on the second inequality in Proposition 2. On one hand, whenever the VEO overthrows the government, the VEO implements policy χ_V for all time. χ_V increasing makes S less willing to fund V because whenever V successfully overthrows the government, it results in a worse policy for S. This strains the second inequality in Proposition 2. On the other hand, the amount of funding needed to get V to fight is decreasing in χ_V. χ_V increasing makes it cheaper for S to

fund the VEO, which makes S more willing to do it. This strengthens the second inequality in Proposition 2.

Observation 3 (Useful Idiots?)*: In the Full Concession Terror threat Equilibrium, decreasing c_V could strengthen or weaken the necessary conditions for a Full Concession Terror Threat Equilibrium.*

If the Sponsor is using VEOs to inflict pain on the Government, is it useful to have VEOs that are stronger and are more willing to engage with Governments? Or is it better to have a "useful idiot," who is weaker? One way to capture this is in evaluating whether stronger or weaker VEOs are more effective at maintaining the Full Concession Equilibrium. As it was with χ_V, we again experience competing effects. Having a lower c_V (i.e. a greater willingness to fight) makes it easier for the sponsor to provide enough funding to get V to fight, thus strengthening the second inequality. But also, having a lower c_V can also undermine the first inequality by making the VEO able to extract enough concessions without the Sponsor's threat to fund.[9] Together, changing c_v can have competing effects.

Observation 4*: In the Full Concession Terror threat Equilibrium, funding ($f_t > 0$) and terrorism (the VEO "fighting") do not occur on the equilibrium path.*

We highlight Observation 4 because this motivates the need for new extensions to the model above. Model extensions could produce the result that it is optimal on-the-path for the VEO to sometimes attack or for the Sponsor to sometimes offer some level of sponsorship. For example, to keep the VEO from dissolving, it may be necessary for the VEO to occasionally attack or for the Sponsor to occasionally provide funds. However, the key strategic interactions examined here—that the Sponsor is threatening to increase funding to the VEO should the Government deviate from making policy concession to the Sponsor—would persist, but the equilibria to these modified versions of the game would require slightly different condi-

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[9]As a draft note, there may be a "better" way to illustrate the point we are trying to make here, specifically by considering an alternate version of P like $P(f_t, \beta)$, where β is some "strength" parameter such that, for a fixed f, $P(f, \beta) > P(f, \beta')$ for $\beta' > \beta$.

tions to be sustained. Alternatively, and this is what we are doing next, we will explore a revision of the above model where the use of funding VEOs functions as part of a screening mechanism; sometimes the Sponsor must fund the VEO to convince the Government that the VEO would be resolved enough to fund the VEO should the government reneg on their most preferred policies.

5 Extensions

We will consider (at least two) extensions to the model above. These will not be included in this version.

First, we will consider a model where the use of funding VEOs functions as part of a screening mechanism. Here the Sponsor has a hidden type and could be "unresolved" (i.e. cares less about the policy issue at hand) or "resolved" (i.e. cares a lot about the policy issue at hand). Here the Sponsor could use supporting the VEO for a period (or more) as a way to signal their resolve in order to get the Government to start implimenting policy concessions.

Second, we will consider a model where the VEO can be destroyed by the government. This is notation heavy, but (we anticipate) will produce the result that G sometimes may want to destroy the VEO early on rather than have to make policy concessions to the VEO or allow the Sponsor to utilize the VEO for all time.

6 Case Studies

For each case, we determine the ideal policies of the VEO, identify its base of supporters and characterize their preferred policies, investigate any policy concessions plausibly made by the targeted government in response, and assess whether support for terrorism among the base changed after those concessions were made. Our theory predicts that the support base should prefer policies more moderate (that is, closer to the status quo) than the VEO's

ideal, that the targeted government should make concessions to the support base, and that this should reduce support for the VEO and lead to its weakening.

We will go into more details regarding case selection in future drafts. In short, we consider cases that scholars have identified as seminal examples where terrorist groups have unambiguously failed to achieve their stated objectives. We can identify, in many of these cases, that there exists a group of sponsors of these groups that do achieve their objectives.

We report our results for the Provisional Irish Republican Army here; the Appendix includes our investigations of Al Qaeda, the Egyptian Islamic Group, and the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam.

6.1   IRA

The Provisional Irish Republican Army, henceforth IRA, split off from the long-standing Irish Republican Army in 1969 in order to pursue a violent campaign of attacks against the British government and its local agents within Northern Ireland. Its clearly-stated goal, which it failed to achieve, was to secure the complete independence of Northern Ireland from the United Kingdom and its reunification with the rest of Ireland into a single nation (Horgan and Taylor, 1997).

The IRA drew its support primarily from the population of Catholics residing in Northern Ireland. The IRA's recruits came overwhelmingly from Northern Ireland and only marginally from the Republic of Ireland (Gill and Horgan, 2013; Moloney, 2003; White, 1997), while the Irish diaspora abroad provided modest funds to the organization (Carswell, 2015; Jones, 1987).

Public opinion polling of Northern Irish Catholics offers strong evidence that this primary base of supporters preferred more moderate changes to the status quo than the IRA. Asked to indicate whether each of a series of potential elements in a peace agreement were "essential," British withdrawal from Northern Ireland (a key to the IRA's goal of reunification) was

deemed so by only 46% of respondents, making it the ninth most essential element of 16. More widely viewed as essential were more limited changes such as including a bill of rights guaranteeing equality for all (78%) and cultural protection (67%), police reform (70%), disbanding militant organizations (67%), returning the British army to its barracks (61%), and politics without a sectarian division (59%) (Irwin, 1998).

The Good Friday Agreement was explicitly designed to bring the violence in Northern Ireland to an end and featured several concessions from the UK government and its Loyalist allies in Northern Ireland to Catholics.[10] Indeed, that agreement's provisions address all of the elements that a majority of Northern Irish Catholics deemed essential. It guarantees that "the power of the sovereign government with jurisdiction there shall be exercised with rigorous impartiality [. . .] and founded on the principles of [. . .] equality of [. . .] rights, of freedom from discrimination [. . .] of both communities." It provides for police reform, the decommissioning of militant organizations, and the normalization of security arrangements (i.e., returning the British army to its barracks). It provides for the devolution of power to a local legislature and executive to ensure autonomy from the UK.

However, the Good Friday Agreement also entailed an explicit recognition that Northern Ireland was part of the UK, and would remain so until majorities in both Northern Ireland and the Republic of Ireland voted otherwise. It thus rejected the main demand of the IRA, for reunification of all of Ireland, while still giving the support base of the IRA much of what it wanted. Unsurprisingly, "almost all [Northern Ireland] Catholics voted for the Agreement" in the referendum held to ratify it (Hayes and McAllister, 2001).

As our theory would predict, support for violence among Northern Ireland's Catholics crashed in the wake of the agreement. In public opinion polls conducted one year after the Good Friday Agreement was made, 58% of Northern Ireland Catholics expressed no sympathy with the reasons for violence among Republican paramilitary groups (i.e., the

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[10]For the full text of the agreement, see Government of the United Kingdom (1998).

IRA) ([Hayes and McAllister, 2005](#)). Even among Northern Irish citizens who expressed sympathy with the IRA, 82.5% nonetheless supported or strongly supported decommissioning, effectively the government-overseen disarmament and disbanding of the IRA.

Faced with a collapse in its support from which it could not recover, the IRA finally announced an end to its armed campaign in 2005. Although two splinter organizations, Real IRA and Continuity IRA, were formed to continue the fight for a reunified Ireland, neither has been able to conduct attacks with any regularity.

7   Conclusion

Does terror work? We offer a new answer to this question: yes, for it's sponsors. We establish here that violent extremist organizations can be quite useful to their sponsors, even when their sponsors are more moderate actors. Put another way, treating the sponsor as the principal, agents with extreme preferences can still be useful or, as established in Observation 2, can even be more useful.

Appendix

A   A More General Equilibrium

The **Terror Threat Equilibrium** below is a generalized version of the Full Concession Terror Threat Equilibrium. In the Terror Threat Equilibrium, the selected policy can fall short of the Sponsor's ideal point. Recall that $x^V(0)$ denotes the x_t offer that will make a VEO indifferent between between attacking and not attacking given a funding level of $f_t = 0$.

Definition: In the **Terror Threat Equilibrium**, G will make some policy concession $\hat{x}$ such that $x^V(0) < \hat{x} \leq \chi_S$. Each player's strategy is as follows.

- In period $t = 1$, G fixes policy $x_t = \hat{x}$. In periods $t > 1$, the following is equilibrium play:

    - If G previously set $x_{t-1} \geq \hat{x}$ and S previously set $f_{t-1} = 0$, then G will set $x_t = \hat{x}$;[11]

    - If G previously set $x_{t-1} \geq \hat{x}$ and S previously set $f_{t-1} > 0$, then G will set $x_t = x_V(0)$;

    - If G previously set $x_{t-1} < \hat{x}$ and S previously set $f_{t-1} = \hat{f}(\hat{x})$, then G will set $x_t = \hat{x}$;

    - If G previously set $x_{t-1} < \hat{x}$ and S previously set $f_{t-1} < \hat{f}(\hat{x})$ or $f_{t-1} > \hat{f}(\hat{x})$, then G will set $x_t = x_V(0)$.

- For all periods, if G sets $x_t \geq \hat{x}$, then S sets $f_t = 0$; if G sets $x_t < \hat{x}$, S will set $f_t = \hat{f}(\hat{x})$.

- For all periods, if $f_t = 0$ and $x_t < 1 - \frac{(1-\delta)c_V}{(1-P(0))}$, then V will attack; if $f_t = 0$ and $x_t \geq 1 - \frac{(1-\delta)c_V}{(1-P(0))}$, then V will not attack; if $f_t > 0$ and $x_t \leq 1 - \frac{(1-\delta)c_V}{(1-P(f_t))}$ then V will attack; if $f_t > 0$ and $x_t > 1 - \frac{(1-\delta)c_V}{(1-P(f_t))}$, V will not attack. If V attacks and wins, then

---

[11]Note that $x_{t-1} > \hat{x}$ will never want to be played, but this is needed for equilibrium considerations.

V will set $x_{t,V} = 1$ for the current and all future periods.[12]

And we can define existence conditions.

Proposition 1A. Some offer $\hat{x} \in (x^V(0), \chi_S]$ can be part of a Terror Threat Equilibrium if and only if $x^S(\hat{f}(\hat{x}))$ is non-empty, $x^S(\hat{f}(\hat{x})) \leq x^G(\hat{f}(\hat{x}))$, and $\hat{x} \in [x^S(\hat{f}(\hat{x})), x^G(\hat{f}(\hat{x}))]$

Here is the intuition for Proposition 1A. If $x^V(0) \geq \hat{x}$, then the sponsor isn't inducing any real change in equilibrium behavior beyond what would arise between V and G; in other words, S isn't actually using terrorism as a threat here. And, any $\hat{x} > \chi_S$ becomes counterproductive for the Sponsor. Additionally, there must exist a $x^S(\hat{f}(\hat{x}))$; otherwise, there does not exist any feasible offer that would keep S on the equilibrium path. Finally, it must be that $\hat{x}$ falls between $x^S(\hat{f}(\hat{x}))$ and $x^G(\hat{f}(\hat{x}))$ (inclusive). If $\hat{x} < x^S(\hat{f}(\hat{x}))$ then S is unwilling to fund the VEO for a round. If $\hat{x} > x^G(\hat{f}(\hat{x}))$, then G prefers selecting $x_t = 0$ for all t, knowing that this will result in S funding V and V attacking G.

B Deriving the VEO's Constraints

All constraints are derived for the Terror Threat Equilibrium (in other words, not for the Full Concession Terror Threat Equilibrium).

B.1 One Shot Deviation

What if G deviates for a single round? I assume the equilibrium path is G always setting $\hat{x}$. But, in equilibrium, if G deviates to $x' < \hat{x}$, then V gets funding infusion f. What is V's utility for fighting for that one round such that, if V wins, V will set $x_{t,V} = \chi_V$?

---

[12]Note the inequalities. It needs to be the case that for zero funding, G can fix an offer that will keep V from fighting. And, it needs to be that there is some defined level of funding that will induce V to attack. If these inequalities weren't as they are, there would be open set issues with the sponsor trying to hit the minimum level of funding needed.

$$U_V(fight\,one\,round) = P(f_t)\left((x' - \chi_V) + \delta\left((\hat{x} - \chi_V)/(1 - \delta)\right)\right) + (1 - P(f_t))\left(0/(1 - \delta)\right) - c_V$$

$$= P(f_t)\left(x' - \chi_V\right) + \frac{P(f_t)\delta(\hat{x} - \chi_V)}{(1 - \delta)} - c_V$$

Now I can compare this utility to V's utility from tolerating the one-period deviation. Note that V must be willing to fight, or else the equilibrium breaks down.

$$(x' - \chi_V) + \frac{\delta(\hat{x} - \chi_V)}{1 - \delta} \leq P(f_t)\left(x' - \chi_V\right) + \frac{P(f_t)\delta(\hat{x} - \chi_V)}{(1 - \delta)} - c_V$$

Or simply, it must be that

$$x' \leq \chi_V - \frac{\delta(\hat{x} - \chi_V)}{1 - \delta} - \frac{c_V}{(1 - P(f_t))} \tag{1}$$

If x' is less than the right-hand-side, then V will want to fight. Otherwise, V will not. Note for a fixed f_t, V is least willing to fight over a deviation $x' = \hat{x} - \epsilon$ where epsilon is very small. So, in order for the equilibrium to be sustained—for V to be willing to fight over any ϵ deviation—V must be willing to fight when $x' = \hat{x}$ for that fixed offer value and funding level. So, for the calculations below, I'm going to fix $x' = \hat{x}$, fix the funding to level $\hat{f}$, and plug it into (1) above. For V to escalate following any ϵ deviation, the following must hold.

$$\frac{\hat{x}(1 - \delta)}{1 - \delta} \leq \chi_V - \frac{\delta(\hat{x} - \chi_V)}{1 - \delta} - \frac{c_V}{(1 - P(f_t))}$$

Or simply

$$\hat{x} \leq \chi_V - \frac{c_V(1-\delta)}{1-P(\hat{f})}.$$

And, I can use the above inequality to identify $\hat{f}(\hat{x})$, which is the amount needed to make V willing to fight following the one-shot ϵ deviation where, following the deviation, so long that S funds and V attacks G returns to offering $\hat{x}$. It must be that $\hat{f}(\hat{x})$ satisfies the following:

$$\frac{c_V(1-\delta)}{1-P(\hat{f})} \leq \chi_V - \hat{x}$$

or simply

$$P(\hat{f}(\hat{x})) \leq 1 - \frac{c_V(1-\delta)}{\chi_V - \hat{x}}$$

Finally: note that in the equilibrium discussion, we need to consider what happens when G deviates from $\hat{x}$ and S does not fund the VEO ($f_t = 0$). In the following round, G will ignore S, and treat what follows as a negotiation with the VEO. If the following condition holds, then the VEO will not fight.

$$x^V(0) \geq \chi_V - \frac{c_V(1-\delta)}{1-P(0)} \tag{2}$$

C Deriving G's Constraints

For the behavior described above to constitute an equilibrium for G, it must be that (a) G is happy staying on the equilibrium path, and that (b) should G deviate from the equilibrium path and S not fund V, then G will select $x^V(0)$ (defined in (2) above) rather than set $x_t = 0$ for all t (which we assume, for now, results in V going to war).

C.1   G deviating from equilibrium behavior (when S funds)

First, G must be unwilling to deviate from equilibrium offer $\hat{x}$ and select some x' where $x' < \hat{x}$. Based on the characterization of the equilibrium, deviating to any x' will result S sending funding $\hat{f}(\hat{x})$ (abbreviated below as $\hat{f}$) and V attacking and setting χ_V if V wins. I first calculate G's utility from deviating to x' when the funding is flowing.

$$
\begin{aligned}
U_G(x') =& P(\hat{f})\,(-x')) + \left(1 - P(\hat{f})\right)\left(-\chi_V * \frac{1}{1-\delta}\right) - c_G + \\
& + \delta P(\hat{f})\left(P(\hat{f})\,(-(x')) + \left(1 - P(\hat{f})\right)\left(-\chi_V * \frac{1}{1-\delta}\right) - c_G\right) + \\
& + \delta^2 P(\hat{f})^2\left(P(\hat{f})\,(-(x')) + \left(1 - P(\hat{f})\right)\left(-\chi_V * \frac{1}{1-\delta}\right) - c_G\right) + \ldots
\end{aligned}
$$

Or

$$
U_G(x') = -\frac{P(\hat{f})\,(x')}{1 - \delta P(\hat{f})} - \frac{(1 - P(\hat{f}))\chi_V}{(1 - \delta P(\hat{f}))(1-\delta)} - \frac{c_G}{1 - \delta P(\hat{f})}.
$$

From the above, the optimal deviation for G will be to set $x' = 0$ for all t. This will give G

$$
U_G(x_t = 0) = -\frac{\chi_V(1 - P(\hat{f}))}{(1 - \delta P(\hat{f}))(1-\delta)} - \frac{c_G}{1 - \delta P(\hat{f})}
$$

Using this, I can identify the bounds on how far $\hat{x}$ can go. G will stay on the path so long that the following holds:

$$
\frac{-(\hat{x})}{1 - \delta} \geq -\frac{\chi_V(1 - P(\hat{f}))}{(1 - \delta P(\hat{f}))(1-\delta)} - \frac{c_G}{1 - \delta P(\hat{f})},
$$

or whenever

$$
\frac{\chi_V(1 - P(\hat{f})) + c_G(1-\delta)}{(1 - \delta P(\hat{f}))} \geq \hat{x}. \tag{3}
$$

26

We can then define the worst offer that will keep G on the path, conditional on the offer being less than or equal to χ_S as

$$x^G = min\left\{\chi_S, \frac{\chi_V(1 - P(\hat{f})) + c_G(1 - \delta)}{(1 - \delta P(\hat{f}))}\right\}.$$

C.2   G's Behavior When S Fails to Fund

Here I want to understand what G will do if G defects and S fails to fund. First, I calculate G's payoffs from setting $x_t = 0$ when S does not fund V. This is

$$
\begin{aligned}
U_G(x_t = 0) =& P(0)\,(0) + (1 - P(0))\left(-\chi_V * \frac{1}{1 - \delta}\right) - c_G + \\
&+ \delta P(0)\left(P(0)\,(0) + (1 - P(0))\left(-\chi_V * \frac{1}{1 - \delta}\right) - c_G\right) + \\
&+ \delta^2 P(0)^2\left(P(0)\,(-(0)) + (1 - P(0))\left(-\chi_V * \frac{1}{1 - \delta}\right) - c_G\right) + \ldots
\end{aligned}
$$

$$= -\frac{\chi_V(1 - P(0))}{(1 - \delta)(1 - \delta P(0))} - \frac{c_G}{(1 - \delta P(0))}$$

I can compare this to G always setting $x^V(0)$ in perpetuity, which is the minimum concession needed to keep V from attacking. Comparing the two is

$$-\frac{x^V(0)}{1 - \delta} \geq -\frac{\chi_V(1 - P(0))}{(1 - \delta P(0))(1 - \delta)} - \frac{c_G}{1 - \delta P(0)}$$

$$-x^V(0) \geq -\frac{\chi_V(1 - P(0))}{1 - \delta P(0)} - \frac{c_G(1 - \delta)}{1 - \delta P(0)}$$

Substituting in what we have above for $x^V(0)$

$$-\chi_V + \frac{c_V(1-\delta)}{1-P(0)} \geq -\frac{\chi_V(1-P(0))}{1-\delta P(0)} - \frac{c_G(1-\delta)}{1-\delta P(0)}$$

$$\frac{\chi_V(1-P(0))}{1-\delta P(0)} + \frac{c_G(1-\delta)}{1-\delta P(0)} + \frac{c_V(1-\delta)}{1-P(0)} - \chi_V \geq 0$$

D Deriving S's Constraints (Deriving Q)

Suppose in equilibrium G plays $\hat{x} \in [x^V(0), \chi_S]$. Now suppose that G deviates from equilibrium play for one round (in period t), selecting some $x_t = x' < \hat{x}$. The left hand side is S's utility for punishing for a round, which is assumed to return the game to the equilibrium policy concession $\hat{x}$. The right hand side is S not implementing their punishment in period t, and then in period $t+1$ (and thereafter) G reverting to their stage-game equilibrium of always setting $x_t = x^V(0)$ while S does not ever fund. This is

$$-P(\hat{f})|\chi_S - x'| + (1-P(\hat{f}))\left(-\frac{\chi_V - \chi_S}{1-\delta}\right) - C(\hat{f}) + P(\hat{f})\delta\left(-\frac{\chi_S - \hat{x}}{1-\delta}\right) \geq -|\chi_S - x'| - \frac{\delta\left(\chi_S - x^V(0)\right)}{1-\delta}$$

As it was above, the most difficult deviation for S to be willing to punish is $x' = \hat{x} - \epsilon$ for some very small $\epsilon > 0$. Thus, to insure the inequality holds, we set $x' = \hat{x}$. The inequality becomes the following:

$$-P(\hat{f})(\chi_S - \hat{x}) + (1-P(\hat{f}))\left(-\frac{\chi_V - \chi_S}{1-\delta}\right) - C(\hat{f}) + P(\hat{f})\delta\left(-\frac{\chi_S - \hat{x}}{1-\delta}\right) \geq -(\chi_S - \hat{x}) - \frac{\delta(\chi_S - x^v(0))}{1-\delta}$$

or simply

$$\hat{x} \geq \frac{-(1-P(\hat{f}))\chi_V - (1-2P(\hat{f}))\chi_S + C(\hat{f})(1-\delta) - \chi_S + \delta x^V(0)}{P(\hat{f})-1+\delta}.$$

It must be that $\hat{x}$ is greater than the RHS or else S never gets enough out of the arrangement (funding the VEO) to make supporting ever worth it. I can go a bit further with this

for the Full Concession Terror Threat Equilibrium. First, assume that $x^V(0) = 0$ and $P(\hat{f}(\chi_S)) = 1 - \frac{c_V(1-\delta)}{\chi_V - \chi_S}$. The former means that V is not willing to fight without funding even if G sets $x_t = 0$. This means

$$\chi_S \geq \frac{-\chi_S + (1 + \frac{c_V(1-\delta)}{\chi_V - \chi_S})\chi_V + (-1 + \frac{c_V(1-\delta)}{\chi_V - \chi_S})(-\chi_S) + \kappa\hat{f}(\chi_S)(1 - \delta)}{-\frac{c_V(1-\delta)}{\chi_V - \chi_S} + \delta}$$

E Proof of Proposition 2

This follows from the construction above.

F Proving Observation 2

Recall for S, for the Terror Threat Equilibrium to hold, it must be that

$$-P(\hat{f})(\chi_S - \hat{x}) + (1 - P(\hat{f}))\left(-\frac{\chi_V - \chi_S}{1 - \delta}\right) - C(\hat{f}) + P(\hat{f})\delta\left(-\frac{\chi_S - \hat{x}}{1 - \delta}\right) \geq -(\chi_S - \hat{x}) - \frac{\delta(\chi_S - x^v(0))}{1 - \delta}$$

Substituting in $\hat{x} = \chi_S$ yields

$$(1 - P(\hat{f}))\left(-\frac{\chi_V - \chi_S}{1 - \delta}\right) - C(\hat{f}) \geq -\frac{\delta(\chi_S - x^v(0))}{1 - \delta}$$

Substituting in $P(\hat{f}(x_t)) = 1 - \frac{c_V(1-\delta)}{\chi_V - x_t}$ and $C(\hat{f}) = \kappa\hat{f}(\chi_S)$ gives

$$(\frac{c_V(1-\delta)}{\chi_V - \chi_S})\left(-\frac{\chi_V - \chi_S}{1 - \delta}\right) - \kappa\hat{f}(\chi_S) \geq -\frac{\delta(\chi_S - x^v(0))}{1 - \delta}$$

or simply

$$-\delta x^v(0) - \kappa\hat{f}(\chi_S)(1 - \delta) \geq c_V(1 - \delta) - \delta\chi_S.$$

Consider what increasing χ_V does to the left-hand side. Recall $x^V(0_t) = max\left\{\chi_V - \frac{c_V(1-\delta)}{1-P(0)}, 0\right\}$, meaning that whenever $x^V(0) = \chi_V - \frac{c_V(1-\delta)}{1-P(0)}$, the term $-\delta x^v(0)$ is decreasing as χ_V increases, making this inequality strained or break. Also recall $\hat{f}(\chi_S)$ satisfies $P(\hat{f}(\chi_S)) = 1 - \frac{c_V(1-\delta)}{\chi_V - x_t}$. As χ_V increases, the expression $1 - \frac{c_V(1-\delta)}{\chi_V - x_t}$ gets smaller. Because $P(\cdot)$ is decreasing in it's argument, $\hat{f}(\chi_S)$ is decreasing as χ_V increases. This implies $-\kappa\hat{f}(\chi_S)$ is getting larger, strengthening the inequality.

Together, the left-hand side could be increasing or decreasing as χ_V increases.

G Proving Observation 3

Pending.

Part I

Case Studies Appendix

Al Qaeda

1. Who is the targeted government G? Who is T? Who is S?

Government Players

There are multiple governments involved in the case of Al Qaeda due to its massive global footprint. The primary one of focus for this paper is Saudi Arabia. Because so many of the 9/11 hijackers were from Saudi, and because it's the birthplace of bin Laden, the country received a lot of attention in the years after 2001. All this attention generated good reports and statistical data that isn't as prevalent, in-depth, or well-analyzed this early on in other

countries. This means that Saudi is a great case study for how AQ attacks and government counterterrorism efforts each affected public opinion, and there is lots of commentary from pollsters and experts on Saudi. Pakistan and Afghanistan, as the early and dominant home bases of AQ, are another logical choice on which to focus. Sudan and Qatar are also of import, as is the United States government. (Stanford University, a) Polling data later in this paper will be drawn from a broader selection of countries in which AQ operated.

Terrorists

The terrorists are Sunni Salafists. Osama bin Laden, the leader of AQ until his death in 2011, drew his original supporters from Afghanistan and Pakistan following the end of the Soviet-Afghan war in 1989. During the war, there was a massive recruitment of Arab fighters with 2,000 coming from Egypt, 3,000 from Algeria, and 5,000 from Saudi Arabia. (Post, 2008, 4) Bin Laden's support base then quickly expanded into Egypt, where Ayman Zawahiri, who busy heading up his own terrorist organization, pledged allegiance to AQ. (Post, 2008, 5) Following bin Laden's expulsion from Afghanistan in 1991, he fled to Sudan where the head of an Islamist political party had already been encouraging bin Laden to expand his network. (Post, 2008, 6) While he was in Sudan, "The group continued training operations near the Afghan-Pakistani border, expanded its connections in Muslim countries, especially Somalia and Yemen, and bought weapons and technical equipment... Bin Laden also forged connections with extremist Islamist groups from Saudi Arabia, Egypt, Jordan, Lebanon, Iraq, Oman, Algeria, Libya, Tunisia, Morocco, Somalia, Eritrea, Chad, Mali, Niger, Nigeria, Uganda, Burma, Thailand, Malaysia, and Indonesia. AQ began to provide equipment, training assistance, and recruits to Islamist insurgencies in the Philippines, Indonesia, Pakistan, and Tajikistan." (Post, 2008)

Supporters

The supporters of AQ also tend to be Sunni Salafists from Saudi, Afghanistan, and Pakistan, as well as all those countries listed in the paragraph above. Since AQ is a global terrorist

organization that often acts as the umbrella TO for many smaller, country-specific organizations, pinpointing the demographics of AQ more broadly is challenging. However, there are four broad categories that pertain to why people supported AQ, especially in its early decades: (Wright, 2016)

Disappointment in governments by young, unemployed, sometimes highly literate Saudis. A poll conducted in 2003 by a Saudi national security consultant involving interviews with more than 15,000 Saudis shows 53% of the respondents held a favorable view of bin Laden's sermons and rhetoric. There was a lack of employment opportunities, and youth resonated with bin Laden's message of "death is better than humiliation." There was also huge inflation which coupled with the disappointment in the overall mismanagement of Saudi economy by government.

Question: "What is your opinion of Osama bin Laden's sermons and rhetoric?"

Answer: 53% favorable

Analysis of the answer: "They like what he said about what's going on in Iraq and Afghanistan. Or about America and the Zionist conspiracy. But what he does, that's where you see the huge drop," said Obaid, referring to the bombings that had already begun taking place inside Saudi Arabia at the time the poll was conducted. (Shuster, 2004)

There was ideological upheaval and similar religious outlook among a) religious radicals with jihadi ideologies (development of Jihadi Salafism), b) people who embrace the political elements of jihadi ideologies and seek to repel regional and international influence, and c) wealthy Saudi donors who resonate with the puritanical religious ideology

Local recruits in countries and areas that are already marred by conflict. For example, Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb worked with local Tuareg separatists to seize major cities in Mali during the political turmoil in 2012. Al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula took advantage of Yemen's chaos to draw recruits from local communities and captured territory in the south

in both 2011 and 2015.

Foreign intervention when it was designed to change the current political state. There was a surge in recruits after both 1990-1991 Gulf War and 2003 U.S. invasion of Iraq. The Palestinian public was also in favor is AQ's goal of eliminating Israel despite AQ not including the establishment of a Palestinian state in its mandate.

2. What is the ideal outcome for T, and what is the ideal outcome for S?

Government's Ideal Outcome

The Saudi government wanted nothing to do with bin Laden and AQ following the Afghan war even though the Saudi government had helped fund the mujahedeen during it. (Stanford University, a) The Saudi government was content with its version of Wahabi Islam and did not want radical jihad to consume the ideology of the country. (Riedel and Saab, 2008) They ignored bin Laden's request to send mujahideen into Kuwait and instead allowed the U.S. army to establish military bases in Saudi. (Riedel and Saab, 2008) Later, when bin Laden released a fatwa declaring war on the United States, the Saudi government put pressure on the Taliban to stifle bin Laden. (Riedel and Saab, 2008) However, 9/11 throws a rather large wrinkle into this apparently clear-cut story. The F.B.I., along with other American agencies, still is split over if the Saudi government was involved in 9/11, and, if they were, then to what extent and how high up the pecking order did the plotting go. (Golden and Rotella, 2020) What is clear is that following 9/11, the Saudi government strongly disavowed its connection to bin Laden and the other 18 Saudi terrorists on the plane, and the Saudi government reaffirmed its commitment to an ideal outcome of eliminating Al Qaeda and terrorism in general:

The Kingdom of Saudi Arabia has condemned the "regrettable and inhuman bombings and attacks" which took place today at the World Trade Center in Manhattan, New York, and the Pentagon building in Washington DC. An official statement issued today said that Saudi Arabia strongly condemns such acts, which contravene all religious values and human civilized

concepts; and extends sincere condolences to the families of the victims, to U.S. President George W. Bush and to the U.S. people in general. The statement stressed the Kingdom's steadfast position condemning all forms of terrorism, and its ongoing cooperation with the international community to combat it. (Embassy of Saudi Arabia, 2001)

However, as is noted in this Brookings article from 2016:

Complicating this picture, however, is that much of Saudi 'support' for terrorism involves actors outside the Saudi government: the regime has at times supported, at times deliberately ignored, and at still other times cracked down on these actors. Some of these figures are important for regime legitimacy, and it is difficult for the regime to openly oppose them. As a result, the Saudi Kingdom still spews out material that is anti-Semitic, sectarian, glorifies several conflicts in which jihadists play an active role, and otherwise contributes to a climate of radicalization. (Byman, 2016)

Terrorists' Ideal Outcome

AQ's initial ideal outcome is to "rid the Muslim world of Western influence, to destroy Israel, and to create an Islamic caliphate stretching from Spain to Indonesia that imposes strict Sunni interpretation of Shariah law." (Stanford University, a) They would begin enacting this plan by expelling the United States from the Arabian Peninsula, particularly Saudi Arabia, through the targeting of U.S. troops and governmental structures such as consulates and embassies. (Stanford University, a) Bin Laden issued a series of fatwas (Islamic religious legal opinions or declarations) in the 1990s that expanded the goal of AQ to wage Jihad against Israel and America, and target not only America and its allies' troops but also civilians. (199, 1999) Another of bin Laden's, and therefore AQ's, goals, was to unite all Muslims under a pious caliphate that was governed by Islamic law and follow Islamic principles of finance and social conduct. (Stanford University, a)

Immediately following 9/11, the ideal outcome expanded to include a removal of Western countries' foreign policy objects and engagement in the Islamic world. (Stanford University,

a) Following the U.S. assassination of bin Laden in 2011, the goals of the organization shifted once more to fostering a global network with diverse objectives, particularly in Afghanistan, Somalia, Syria, and Yemen. (Stanford University, a)

Supporters' Ideal Outcome

The Saudi people wanted the United States out of their county. (Zogby, 2003) In 2002, 87% of Saudi citizens had an unfavorable opinion of the United States, stemming largely from the U.S. treatment of Palestine in favor of Israel. Unfavourability jumped to 97% in a March 2003 poll taken just three days before the U.S. invaded Iraq. This ten-percentage point increase is demonstrative of a Saudi populace unhappy with America's unilateralist tactics in the region even before the U.S.'s surprise 2003 Iraqi invasion. (Zogby, 2003)

The Saudi people additionally desired for a better economy and social services. Saudi had been in an oil-driven recession since the mid 1980s, and GDP per capita dropped by $10,000 from 1980-1995. (199, 1995) Unemployment had risen – 25% of graduating students were unemployed Lancaster (1994) – and education and health services struggled to keep up with a rapidly growing birth rate. (Gerth, 1993) The ideal outcome was for there to be both an economic and social turnaround, as well as a restructuring of the royal family whose leaders were elderly.25

Classical jihadism had long been supported in Saudi Arabia, but bin Laden had challenging time gaining a foothold in Saudi with his version of radical jihadism. There was no major popular movement among Saudi citizens in support of AQ. The majority of Saudis thought that his global jihad was "utopian and too drastic." (Hegghammer, 2008)

Overall, the survey shows that Saudis are divided and struggling over the future direction of their country. When asked to choose the most important priorities for the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, 93 percent picked reducing unemployment and inflation, followed by addressing the problem of terrorism (88 percent); providing financial assistance to foreign mosques (81 percent); ensuring a free press and free elections (80 percent); defeating Al Qaeda and other

Figure 1: From a 2007 Poll. (Terror Free Tomorrow, 2007a)

Priorities that Saudis Think are Very Important for their Government:

Jihadi groups (61 percent) and permitting women to drive (43 percent).

The fact that 88 percent of Saudis support pursuing Al Qaeda fighters and also see addressing terrorism as an important government goal, yet 61 percent consider defeating Al Qaeda itself as important, reveals some ambivalence towards the idea of Al Qaeda as opposed to its actions, particularly inside Saudi Arabia itself. This is also mirrored by the fact that groups such as Hamas and Hezbollah have a third or more of Saudis expressing a favorable opinion, but terrorist attacks themselves are strongly disapproved. (Terror Free Tomorrow, 2007a)

3. Did T achieve its ideal outcome?

AQ did not achieve its goal of creating a caliphate from Spain to Indonesia.

AQ did achieve its goal of kicking the U.S. out of Saudi Arabia. This was primarily due to not wanting to place American soldiers' lives in danger as numerous terrorist attacks were launched by al-Qaeda and other terrorist organizations against the U.S. force in Saudi Arabia as well as the rest of the Middle East (remember the 1995 housing complex bombing). (Otterman, 2005) In April 2003, AQ set off two bombs in Riyadh that killed 39 and wounded 160.29 The Saudi government was also aware that the U.S. presence was irritating the Saudi populace and the resentment was drawing more people to AQ. (Otterman, 2005) Already, "in August 2001 he [Crown Prince Abdullah] had sent a letter to President Bush complaining of

the American stand on the Arab-Israeli issue. In that letter, he said that differences between the two countries on that issue had grown so great that "from now on, you have your interests and the Kingdom has its interests, and you have your road and we have our road." (Gause, 2003) At the end of April 2003, the U.S. announced its decision to withdraw troops that were left over from the 1990 Gulf War, and they were gone by the end of summer.

In a press statement, Secretary of Defense, Donald Rumsfeld, stated: "'The Persian Gulf is now a safer region because of the change in Iraq.' He also said U.S. planes no longer are needed to enforce a "no-fly" zone over Iraq. American military aircraft patrolling the southern half of Iraq did so in part from Saudi Arabia." (Hedges, 2003)

AQ has had a mixed bag of results over the 35 years that it's been operating. There have been peaks and valleys, but as of 2022 the main consensus is that the original AQ central leadership is demolished, and AQ is a large umbrella organization rather than one with a central nucleus. The name matters more than a core leadership group.

4. Did S achieve its ideal outcome? If not, did G change its policies in a way that moved at least partially toward S's ideal outcome? Was this change in policies closer to the ideal outcome of S or of T?

Yes, the Saudi people achieved their goals. The United States military left Saudi Arabia inn 2003. There was reform to the education system; unemployment levels decreased, and wages increased. Freedom of the press also expanded. This section is only a brief overview because it goes hand in hand with section six which discusses if the government made concessions to undermine support for AQ.

5. If the answer to 3 is no and to 4 is yes: did S's support for T decline in anticipation, during, or after G's policy changes?

Yes, support for AQ declined across almost all of the countries that supported it.

A poll taken from August-November 2003 of 15,000 Saudis showed that 48.7% of the re-

spondents held a favorable view of bin Laden's sermons and rhetoric. However, only 4.7% of the respondents were in favor of bin Laden becoming president. (Shuster, 2004)At this point, there are mixed feelings towards AQ because the attacks were harmful (remember this is just following the Riyadh compound bombings discussed earlier). It appears that people like what bin Laden has to say but are becoming more disenchanted with the attacks inside Saudi Arabia:

As one interviewee from a conservative southern province told our team, "When we hear bin Laden railing against the West, pointing out the corruption and incompetence of the Arab governments and the suffering of the Palestinians, it is like being transported to a dream." But he went on, "when we see the images of innocent people murdered for this ideology, it's as if we've entered a nightmare." (Shuster, 2004)

This sentiment only seems to grow from the second half of 2003 onwards as the attacks continued to pile up, especially the Khober massacre in May of 2004.

Bin Laden's rhetoric, and the continuing strikes by al-Qaeda in Saudi Arabia, is a warning that the threat may take years to entirely eliminate, but the terror campaign since May 2003 does seem to have produced few new recruits and won little popular support. In fact, it has resulted in a backlash among the Saudi population, including many Saudi critical of the government. "People want government reforms and changes, but they are more scared of al-Qaeda extremists," said Mansour Nogaidan, a former Islamic militant and government critic. "The common people–those people who thought their life might improve if the government changed—they are not ready to lose all this for what some teenagers have in their minds as a utopia ... While al-Qaeda still enjoys support from some quarters in Saudi Arabia and among some religious figures, the government campaign to sway Saudi public opinion away from Islamic extremism seems to be gaining momentum. Many Saudis now refer to the militants as "the grim reapers" and believe that they are bent on ruining the country." (Cordesman and Obaid, 2005a)

This poll below was conducted in Nov-Dec of 2007, and highlights the lack of support that AQ received from the Saudi people: (Terror Free Tomorrow, 2007b)

"The idea of supporting Al Qaeda or Bin Laden does not equate with backing actual terrorist attacks. Nor does it mean immutable anti-American views. Saudis reject terrorism and are not clamoring for radical rule from Bin Laden and Al Qaeda; rather, for better relations with the United States." (Terror Free Tomorrow, 2007c)

6. If the answer to 3 is no and to 4 is yes: is there any evidence that G changed policy in order to undermine S's support for T?

Yes. The Saudi government in 2003 began to institute changes that further helped spur the turning tide against AQ. Changes to the religious education programs in the country included "employ[ing] hundreds of government programs to educate the public about radical Islam and extremism, as well as provide alternatives to radicalization among young men. Projects from athletic competitions, to lectures, writing contests, and public information campaigns have all had a significant impact on Saudi public perceptions of terrorism." (Boucek, 2008) This is in direct opposition to bin Laden, who said that educational reform was one of "the most dangerous interferences in our affairs...crusader interference in changing curriculums...Recently there have been several efforts by the Saudi regime to change the curriculum in their schools, and U.S. officials have talked about education reform... as an essential long term strategy for defeating terrorism...The objective is to erase the nation's character and Westernize its sons." (Cordesman and Obaid, 2005a)

As stated in the section on the goals of the Saudi people, electoral reform was a priority, and the actions of AQ spurred the introduction of municipal elections. As one scholar at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace put it: "2003 was the year of reform par excellence. 2003 witnessed not only a growth of literature on reform unprecedented in size and boldness, but also the government's announcement of several reforms, the most significant of which is the holding of municipal elections... Although demands for reform

were voiced in the early 1990s, the government did not respond positively until after the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks in the United States and the May and November 2003 terrorist attacks in the Kingdom. The rise of terrorism seems the most influential factor in forcing the new reaction." (Al-Dakhil, 2008)

The first municipal elections were announced in October of 2003 when the Council of Ministers declared that they would "broaden the participation of citizens in administrating local affairs by means of elections, and to revitalize Saudi Arabia's municipal councils in conformity with the ruling concerning municipalities and villages issued by Royal Decree in 1977, and to ensure that one half of the members of all municipal councils would henceforth be elected... After the events of September 11, 2001, new reformist demands proliferated, ranging from full separation of authorities to requests for more public participation. The government undertook a variety of reforms and amended a number of laws, as well as formulating new ones. These actions opened the door for a national dialogue, enabling, among other things, the establishment of a journalists' association and a public organization for human rights. It was in the context of these reformist developments that the new system of electing half of the members of municipal councils was announced." (Ménoret, 2005)

This final quote on the topic from the NYT drives home the point that terrorism was the dominant factor in allowing elections to begin: "But the fear of domestic terrorism, which was brought home for Saudis after the suicide bombings on May 12 in Riyadh, initiated an unusual public debate. Some of the kingdom's rulers have discussed opening the society. Critics say a lack of democratic freedoms has made the kingdom a breeding ground for militants." (The Associated Press, 2003)

In terms of decreasing unemployment, the Saudi government focused on ensuring that more of its jobs were going to Saudi nationals rather than foreign workers. "More formally, as implemented in Saudi Arabia, Saudization is a development strategy that seeks to replace foreign workers with Saudis. To date this has been largely accomplished through various

employment quota targets. For example, the current [2004] guidelines of the Shura Council (a consultative body) dictate that 70 percent of the workforce must be Saudi by 2007, with Saudization accelerated in some industry sectors... In addition to a series of new economic reforms and initiatives, the government's response to the country's economic problems has also entailed a fairly extensive set of educational, political and social reforms. In their totality, the reforms appear to be influenced not only by the deteriorating economic conditions, but also by concern that the current environment in Saudi Arabia is conducive to terrorist recruitment and activity." (Looney, 2004a)

Saudi Arabia also put lots of effort into other counterterrorism measures. Security and intelligence forces received a 25% pay raise to attract more qualified applicants, new equipment was procured, and the training program updated. On the religious front, the government created a one-month amnesty program grounded in religious principles for members of AQ who hadn't directly participated in attacks to repent, and the government tried to undercut AQ's religious authority:

Al-Qaeda had long accused the Saudi regime of being unIslamic for cooperating with the U.S. and not fully implementing Shar'ia law. In the speech announcing the amnesty, King Fahd included a chapter from the Qur'an that highlighted the importance of the concept of forgiveness in Islam. By demonstrating that the Kingdom was governed by the law of God, the government reasserted its religious authority. This maneuver had the effect of undermining the legitimacy of al-Qaeda which has long used Islam to justify its actions... The government also responded to al-Qaeda's use of illegitimate fatwas to justify its views and behavior with legitimate fatwas. The Saudi Mufti-General issued a fatwa calling on "citizens and residents to inform about each and every one who plans or prepares for committing destructive actions so as to protect the people and the country." This had the effect of depriving al-Qaeda of needed logistical support, making it more difficult to carry out operations. (Looney, 2004b)

A 2008 U.S. military report echoes these previous quotes on what the Saudi government did to combat AQ's influence over Saudi people:

The government put most of its efforts in the areas of education, social programs, economic incentives, and working with influential religious leaders . . . tak[ing] a holistic approach to combating terrorism in many fields of life: education, religion, intellect and tribal leadership . . . [and] expand[ing] the area of universities, higher education institutes and other teaching sources to widen the Saudi base of scholars and knowledgeable people. (Al Doghere, 2008)

Saudi monarchy has remained in power partly because of their firm grasp on the press and media, but the threat of terrorism forced them to slightly democratize via "the expansion of media, press, newspapers and theological views throughout previously inaccessible areas of the kingdom. This policy would hopefully create a counter reaction among the public and raise objection to terrorist operations." (Al Doghere, 2008) Again, just as with the increased emphasis on education, the liberalization of the press to combat the terrorists benefited the Saudi populace.

The numbers of active AQ members in Saudi are the final telltale sign of the success of Saudi government's efforts in 2003 and 2004. There were 500-600 AQ members in Saudi cells at the highest point; by 2004, "between 400-500 militants had been captured or killed, including all of the leaders–this is in addition to the thousands of sympathizers who were arrested and interrogated, most of whom have been freed." (Cordesman and Obaid, 2005b)

Egyptian Islamic Group

1. Who is the targeted government G? Who is T? Who is S?

The terrorist organization was the Egyptian Islamic Group (EIG) which was primarily comprised of college students, recent jobless graduates, and Sunni Salafists. (Kepel, 2003, 141) The government was the Egyptian government which was ruled by Anwar Sadat until 1981

when the EIG (in conjunction with the EIJ) assassinated him, and Hosni Mubarak took control. (Stanford University, c) The supporters were poor/middle class Egyptians who benefitted from the social services that the EIG provided. (Stanford University, c, 149)

2. What is the ideal outcome for T, and what is the ideal outcome for S?

The goal of the EIG was to establish an Islamic caliphate in Egypt that is governed by Sharia'a law. (Extremist Groups: Information for Students, 2022) The Charter of Islamic Action, the formal ideology of the EIG, specifically stated that the EIG's goal was "to establish Islam as a totality in each soul, and over each handbreadth of land, in each house, in each organization, and in each society." (Rabasa *et al.*, 2004, 95) The goal of the Egyptian government was to maintain their secular regime. The goal of the supporters was to increase their standard of living through better social services, including health care, education, food accessibility, housing, and lower unemployment. The supporters also wanted less government repression and bureaucratic ineptitude. (Weaver, 1995)

3. Did T achieve its ideal outcome?

No. The Egyptian government was not overthrown and replaced with a caliphate governed by Sharia'a law. In 1989 as security forces started to ramp up their crackdown, the EIG released six demands Ashour (2007, 611), none of which were met:

1. Releasing all detainees who were not charged.

2. Ceasing torture in prisons, detention centers, and state security buildings.

3. Improving the prison conditions for IG activists who were sentenced by civilian

courts.

4. Releasing female hostages who were taken to force their male relatives to sur-

render to state security agents.

5. Reopening the IG mosques that were shut down.

6. Ceasing the policy of renewing detention indefinitely.

The one concession that the EIG obtained followed the 1999 ceasefire agreement. Following the Luxor attack, the Egyptian government had rounded up many EIG members who the international leaders of the group wanted released. On April 27, 1999 the New York Times reported that the Egyptian government released over 2,000 members of the EIG from its prisons, despite having publicly announced that they would not release any of their detainees. (United States Department of State. Office for Combatting Terrorism and United States Department of State. Office of the Ambassador at Large for Counter-Terrorism and United States. Department of State. Office of the Coordinator for Counterterrorism, 2000, 26) (Gregory, 1999) The 1999 ceasefire was agreed to in March of that year, so while it is impossible to draw a direct connection between the agreement to the ceasefire and the release of the prisoners, one can assume that they were linked.

4. Did S achieve its ideal outcome? If not, did G change its policies in a way that moved at least partially toward S's ideal outcome? Was this change in policies closer to the ideal outcome of S or of T?

Kind of. By the time of the final ceasefire between the EIG and the Egyptian government, the supporters had modestly achieved their goals. As discussed in section six, some of this achievement came from concessions designed to undermine support for the EIG. The remainder of the achievement was a product of foreign aid and IMF loans. It should be noted that while the supporters did achieve some of their goals, the repressive tactics employed by the government curtailed civil and political freedoms: "The rising numbers of political detainees, of civilians referred to military courts, of death sentences, and of other human rights abuses were by and large linked to the increasingly violent conflict between the regime and parts of the Islamist opposition." (Kienle, 1998, 229) It is tricky to tell how EIG supporters balanced desire for a better democracy with an improvement in social and economic conditions. I have not been able to find information on if EIG supporters simply did not care that much about

improving democracy or if the other benefits outweighed the more repressive non-democratic policies.

5. If the answer to 3 is no and to 4 is yes: did S's support for T decline in anticipation, during, or after G's policy changes?

Yes, support for the terrorists declined beginning in the 1990s, with the largest decrease following the 1997 Luxor attack. (Alimi *et al.*, 2015, 159) From the 1980s through the mid 1990s, the social benefits provided by the EIG outweighed the stricter Islamic laws, as was noted by Mary Anne Weaver, a reporter for The New Yorker who lived in Egypt:

"Gama'a-controlled popular mosques had set up discount health clinics and schools, day-care centers, and furniture factories to employ the unemployed, and they provided meat, at wholesale prices, to the poor. Despite an aggressive, ten-million-dollar social program launched by the government last fall, the Islamists' institutions remained generally far more efficient and far superior to run-down government facilities. Along with the collapse of every secular ideology embraced by Egyptian politicians and intellectuals during this century, it was government repression and ineptitude, far more than militants' guns and bombs, that were fuelling [Sic] the Islamic flame... Dissent was rarely tolerated... Groups of militants, armed with knives and guns, went around burning video shops, and there were many neighborhoods that policemen feared to enter after dark... Throughout their areas of control, they imposed Islamic law by fiat. In Imbaba, the Islamists had, for all intents and purposes, created a state within a state." (Weaver, 1995)

The support that the EIG provided was welcome since the economy had been struggling (see Figure 2), and poverty was on the rise:

"According to one of the most comprehensive and methodologically sound studies of diachronic changes in private consumption, poverty increased significantly between the fiscal years 1981-82 and 1990-91. In rural Egypt, the percentage of the poor rose from 16.1 to 28.6 percent of the total population over that period of time; while in urban areas it rose from

18.2 to 20.3 percent. Applying a higher poverty line, including those deemed moderately poor, the percentage rose from 26.9 in 1981-82 to 39.2 percent in rural area and from 33.5 to 39 percent in urban ones. In terms of expenditure deciles, the bottom 80 percent of Egyptian society fared worse than previously, and only the top 20 percent fared better." (Kienle, 1998, 232)

The intensity and brutality of their violence in the 1990s alienated many Egyptians, not least because it severely curtailed tourism, a major source of national and personal income. Most Egyptians viewed the 1997 Luxor attack as horrific, including those who had supported the group's previous attacks, and that attack alone cost Egypt more than $1.5 billion in tourism revenue. (Fletcher, 2008) By that same year, the poverty rate had risen by 4.3% and 8.2% in urban and rural areas, respectively. (Adams, 2000, 263) There were very large economic factors at play that scholars agree drove this increase in poverty, as well as the decline of real wages across every sector of the Egyptian economy, none of which are linked to terrorism. However, the EIG's targeting of tourist attractions, therefore majorly decreasing the clearly much needed revenue from that industry, meant that Egyptians who may have supported the EIG but worked in the tourism industry or would have second-handily benefitted from robust tourism, ceased their support for the organization. (Rabasa *et al.*, 2004, 97) Also: "there was popular fatigue at the militants' heavy-handed interference with Egyptian traditions they interpreted as bid'a—including wedding ceremonies, funeral customs, and dancing." (Rabasa *et al.*, 2004, 97) Scholars from the Carnegie Endowment note that: "In its revisionist documents, al-Jama'a al-Islamiya confesses that it pursued violent Jihad for years as an end rather than a means, failing to take into account the devastating toll that its ostensibly righteous goal was taking on Egyptian society." (Hamzawy and Grebowski, 2010, 3,11)

In July 1997, the domestic leaders of the EIG, some of whom were imprisoned at the time, proposed a ceasefire. During a military trial of an EIG member, the accused read a letter signed by six leaders of the EIG announcing a ceasefire. It later became known as the initia-

tive to stop violence, and it marked a shift in the EIG's philosophy on violence. (Jackson, 2009, 55) Leaders of the EIG who were not in Egypt did not support the ceasefire, and they orchestrated the Luxor attack in an attempt to sabotage the proposal. (Alimi *et al.*, 2015, 159) The Luxor attack killed 63 civilians and tourists. (197, 1977) Additionally, they hoped that the Egyptian government would respond with excessive levels of force, thus engendering more goodwill for the EIG. However, the Egyptian populace was horrified by the attack, and the local EIG leadership doubled down on their support for the ceasefire. (197, 1977) Importantly, Sheikh Abdel Rahman, the spiritual leader of the EIG, supported the ceasefire from his American prison cell. (Alimi *et al.*, 2015, 159)

Since 1981, and especially in the years following 1992, the EIG had been attacking tourists and popular locations in Egypt, but it seems that increasing loss of tourism revenue coupled with an exhaustion of the constant violence finally became too much for the Egyptian populace to bear, and Luxor was the straw that broke the camel's back. The attack exacerbated the rift within the EIG that was forming in 1997 between (primarily domestic) members who wanted to shift away from extremism, and those who wanted to double down. (Alimi *et al.*, 2015, 159) Zawahiri, who was the head of the EIJ, split from the EIJ at this point (approx. Feb of 1998) and allied with Bin Laden's Al-Qaeda, and they released a joint fatwa declaring war on Jews and the Crusaders (aka Americans). Over the next two years, members of the EIG had to choose between switching to the EIJ, following Zawahiri, expanding into global jihad, and continuing to embrace violence, or focusing solely on Egypt and agreeing to the ceasefire. In 1999, the second ceasefire there was another attempt at a ceasefire, and this time it was successful. Following 9/11, the EIG again reaffirmed their commitment to nonviolence.

6. If the answer to 3 is no and to 4 is yes: is there any evidence that G changed policy in order to undermine S's support for T?

Yes – the consensus among journalists and scholars is that the Mubarak regime would have

implemented reforms if the EIG and other Islamist terrorist organizations did not exist, but the speed with which they initiated them is probably because of the threat the EIG posed.

While Mubarak publicly denied any connection between the socioeconomic situation and the rising tide of Islam, he was aware that it was necessary to allocate more resources to problems which were believed to nurture Islamic terrorism: population explosion, illiteracy, widespread unemployment and a shortage of housing... Education, unemployment and housing were also targeted as major national priorities... Thus, although the socioeconomic measures did not alleviate the hardships of the lower-middle class in the short run, the regime hoped that their successful completion would improve the conditions of the less privileged and reduce the phenomenon of Islamic terrorism in the long run. (Weaver, 1995)

In 1991 Egypt received a loan from the IMF to help the country's economic problems that stemmed largely from the drop in oil prices, fewer remittances, and a large foreign debt. Egypt rapidly began implementing economic reforms, however in the mid-1990s, "the regime postponed important privatisation [sic] steps in order to avoid a fundamental restructuring of the public sector causing major social dislocations, which could have potentially threatened its support base and stability." (Paciello, 2011, 108) Privatization, as is noted in the same article as the above quote, would only have benefitted those who were in the military or had powerful connections to the government. The Mubarak regime was aware of the increasing number of EIG attacks and likely did not want to further alienate the Egyptian populace. Despite the postponement of privatization, the Egyptian economy had been on the rise since the 1991 IMF loan, but "in the late-1990s, however, macroeconomic performance weakened as a result of a combination of policy and external factors." The IMF stated that one of those external factors was a temporary decrease in tourism revenue. This is directly related to EIG attacks on the tourism industry, including the Luxor attack. (IMF, 2001)

Over the course of the 1990s, poverty in Egypt had shrunk: it went from 24.18% in 1990/91 – 16.74% in 1999/2000. (Ghoneim, 2015) The unemployment rate also decreased from approx-

imately 11% to 8% over that same time. ([Mansour and Zaki, 2020](#)) There is no source that blatantly links the increases in the overall economic improvements in Egypt with a decrease in popular support for the EIG. However, I believe that there is a very strong circumstantial argument to be made that they are correlated.

Final note: While the government did make some concessions to appease the Egyptian people, it was years of government crackdowns that crushed the terrorist organization. Lack of support contributed to the EIG's unwillingness to weather the harsh penalties, but the Mubarak regime put an end to the EIG:

"The analysis reveals that the high audience cost of violence and growing public condemnation led al-Gama'a al-Islamiyya's leaders to rethink the group's mission and push for permanent disengagement from violence." ([Matesan, 2020](#))

"By the end of the 1990s, the victory of the security forces over Jihadists was inevitable, and Jihadi attempts to violently change society and politics had clearly failed." ([Hamzawy and Grebowski, 2010](#), 2–3)

Irish Republican Army

1. Who is the targeted government G? Who is T? Who is S?

The terrorist organization was Irish Republican Army (IRA) which was originally established in 1919 and fought the Irish War of Independence. After the Anglo-Irish Treaty in 1921, the old IRA split into pro-Treaty forces and anti-Treaty forces. The anti-Treaty IRA eventually lost the Irish Civil War. In 1969, the organization split again into two main groups: Provisional IRA and Official IRA. The Provisional IRA soon became known as simply the IRA, while Official IRA gradually ceased its violent activities. The Provisional IRA operated mostly in Northern Ireland, using violence against the royal Ulster Constabulary and the British Army, and British institutions and economic targets. The targeted government was

Figure 2: If you look at the red line, you see a sharp decrease in 1998. Luxor was Nov '97, so the effects were primarily felt the next year (remember that Luxor caused 50% of tourism revenue to be lost) (IMF, 2021)

the British government. The supporter groups include Catholic sectarianists in Northern Ireland, Sinn Féin, some people from the Irish Republic, and Irish diaspora.

Catholic supporters

Catholic sectarianists supported IRA largely in the form of supplying new recruits. According to his article, White wrote "a common view is that the conflict in Northern Ireland is a sectarian one, in the sense that the killing there is undertaken by Catholic and Protestant extremists who attack each other's communities.1" In his book, A Secret History of the IRA, Moloney wrote "Whereas the first IRA commanders were Southerners (Irish Republic), the foot soldiers in the war, the Volunteers, came overwhelmingly from the North and at first, mostly from Belfast, where the attempted loyalist pogroms of August 1969 had taken place.2" According to an article that conducted an empirical analysis of a dataset of 1240 former members of PIRA, out of 503 militants whose birth location could be identified, 82.7% of the sample were born in Northern Ireland while 13.9% were born in the Republic of Ireland.3

Sinn Féin

Sinn Féin was both a supporter and a partner of IRA. Sinn Féin is an Irish separatist organization founded in 1905 by Aurthur Griffith. The contemporary Sinn Féin party took its form in 1970 and was historically associated with the Provisional Irish Republican Army. Sinn Féin was considered the political wing of the IRA.4

In one of its press briefings in 2005, the British government claimed that "we had always said all the way through we believed that Sein Fein and the IRA were inextricably linked and that had obvious implications at leadership level.5"

Supporters from the Irish Republic

There was support from the Irish Republic as well. First IRA commanders were from the Irish Republic.6 There was also public support for IRA in the late twentieth century. It is

estimated that there were '20/40,000 active supports' of the IRA in late 1971 according to Irish military intelligence.7 However, the popular sympathy decreased rapidly thereafter with increasing IRA bombs and violence associated with Northern issues in the Republic.8 There was public support for paramilitary violence throughout much of the twentieth century as well.9

Irish Diaspora

Another supporter group is constituted of Irish diaspora. The most notable example is the Irish Northern Aid Committee, or Noraid, which conducted fundraising activities in the U.S. for IRA since the start of the Troubles. According to the US department of justice, it "raised almost $3.6 million over a 19-year period to 1990.10" Noraid was openly supportive of the IRA's armed struggle.11

2. What is the ideal outcome for T, and what is the ideal outcome for S?

The terrorist organization, IRA, demanded British withdrawal from Northern Ireland, full independence from the UK, and reunification with the Irish Republic.

As stated in the PIRA Constitution:

"To guard and honor and uphold the sovereignty and unity of the Republic of Ireland.12"

"To support the establishment of an Irish Socialist Republic based on 1916 Proclamation.13"

"To support the establishment of and uphold a lawful government in sole and absolute control of the Republic.14"

PIRA split off from the old IRA with the initial aim to protect the Catholic minority from discrimination from loyalist militants and the Protestant-Majority police force.15 In describing the IRA, J. Bowyer Bell writes that they "are not simply defenders of vulnerable Northern nationalists nor disgruntled working-class radicals nor the residue of old crusades, but believers" in the 'dream' of a united Ireland, free and Gaelic.16 For Republicans, "the never-failing

source of all Irish political evils has always been the English connection.17" According to IRA's ideology, they envisioned a Republic established with the common name of Irishmen in substitution of the denomination of Protestant, Catholic, and Dissenter in a united, free island.18

Catholic supporters

The Catholic supporters of IRA had more moderate goals in mind. They prioritized equal rights and treatments, police reform, decommissioning of all paramilitary groups, and no discrimination in politics.

According to a poll published on Belfast Telegraph on January 10, 1998, before the signing of the Good Friday Agreement, "British withdrawal from Northern Ireland" only ranked 9th on the list for Catholics, showing a more moderate stance than that of IRA.19

According to another poll published on March 31, 1998, the eve of signing the Good Friday Agreement, 77% of all of Northern Irelanders voted yes to the question "if a majority of the political parties elected to take part in the Stormont Talks agreed to this settlement would you vote to accept it in a referendum?20" 81% of Catholic voted yes.21

Sinn Féin

Sinn Féin had a similar goal to IRA. According to a republican document in early 1980s,

"Both the IRA and Sinn Féin play different but convergent roles in the war of national liberation. The Irish Republican Army wages an armed campaign in the occupied six counties while its elements in the 26 counties play a supportive role. Sinn Féin maintains the propaganda war and is the public and political voice of the Movement . . . The Movement must have a vital mass organisation of the Irish people on its side with which to confront reactionary elements in the country who will attempt to stop us advancing beyond a British withdrawal situation and on to the socialist republic. Such a mass organisation will not be built purely by calling on the Irish people to support the IRA. The exploited masses

must be made to identify with the national liberation struggle because they see a successful conclusion of the war as being essential for their own social and economic liberation.22"

As of now, according to its website, Sinn Féin's national and democratic objectives are national reunification, political independence, and national sovereignty.23

Supporters from the Irish Republic

Supporters from the Irish Republic demands reunification of the island of Ireland. According to Hayes and Mcallister, "in fact, throughout much of the twentieth century not only did a significant majority of citizens within the Republic of Ireland explicitly endorse the view that the island of Ireland should be reunited, but a notable minority condoned the use of paramilitary methods to achieve this goal.24"

Irish Diaspora

Irish Northern Aid Committee, or Noraid, originally supported IRA's armed struggle to unite the Irish Republic and Northern Ireland. Now it supports the implementation of Good Friday Agreement despite its desire of establishing a democratic 32-county Ireland.

According to an article published on The Washington Post,

"Who does Noraid aid? Fundraising letters sent out in 1971 and 1972 said: "Our support goes exclusively to the Provisional IRA and those who are working with them." Where does the money go? "Our funds are channelled through Joe Cahill of Belfast to be used for the advancement of the campaign in Northern Ireland." What is the relationship between the IRA and Noraid? "We are fighting a guerrilla war and will continue to do so. We, the members of the Provisional Irish Republican Army, will fight and die until victory is ours. Remember, the Irish Northern Aid Committee is the only organization in America that supports the Provisional IRA."25"

3. Did T achieve its ideal outcome?

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Since North Ireland did not unite with the Republic of Ireland, IRA did not achieve its ideal outcomes.

4. Did S achieve its ideal outcome? If not, did G change its policies in a way that moved at least partially toward S's ideal outcome? Was this change in policies closer to the ideal outcome of S or of T?

Catholic supporters

Catholic supporters achieved their ideal outcomes. In the Good Friday Agreement, the British and Irish governments agreed, irrespective of the position of Northern Ireland: "the power of the sovereign government with jurisdiction there shall be exercised with rigorous impartiality on behalf of all the people in the diversity of their identities and traditions and shall be founded on the principles of full respect for, and equality of, civil, political, economic, social and cultural rights, of freedom from discrimination for all citizens, and of parity of esteem and of just and equal treatment for the identity, ethos and aspirations of both communities.26"

As part of the agreement, the British parliament repealed the Government of Ireland Act 1920 (which had established Northern Ireland, partitioned Ireland and asserted a territorial claim over all of Ireland) and the people of the Republic of Ireland amended Articles 2 and 3 of the Constitution of Ireland, which asserted a territorial claim over Northern Ireland.27

On the issue of decommissioning and normalization, against the background of political violence during the Troubles, the agreement committed the participants to "exclusively democratic and peaceful means of resolving differences on political issues.28" This took two aspects:

The decommissioning of weapons held by paramilitary groups;

The normalization of security arrangements in Northern Ireland.

On the issue of equality and human rights, the agreement affirmed a commitment to "the

mutual respect, the civil rights and the religious liberties of everyone in the community.29"
The multi-party agreement recognized "the importance of respect, understanding and tolerance in relation to linguistic diversity", especially in relation to the Irish language, Ulster Scots, and the languages of Northern Ireland's other ethnic minorities, "all of which are part of the cultural wealth of the island of Ireland.30" The agreement also includes the reform of the Police Force and Judicial System.31 It includes changes of controversial police force symbol, uniforms, and flag.32 It also adds a new oath of allegiance which upholds human rights and equal respect to all communities.33

The British government committed to incorporating the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) into the law of Northern Ireland and to the establishment of a Northern Ireland Human Rights Commission.34 Establishing statutory obligations for public authorities in Northern Ireland to carry out their work "with due regard to the need to promote equality of opportunity was set as a particular priority.35" The Irish government committed to "[taking] steps to further the protection of human rights in its jurisdiction" and to the establishment of an Irish Human Rights Commission.36

Irish Diaspora

Although Noraid didn't achieve its ideal outcomes, the Good Friday Agreement moved in favor of its ideal outcomes.

Sinn Féin

Sinn Féin did not achieve its ideal outcomes since the Republic of Ireland and Northern Ireland did not unite. However, the Good Friday Agreement indeed worked in favor of achieving some demands made by this support group. Senn Féin is also one of the eight political parties or groupings from Northern Ireland that participated in the agreement. It has become more involved in the politics in Northern Ireland since then and now has become the largest political party in the island of Ireland.37

5. If the answer to 3 is no and to 4 is yes: did S's support for T decline in anticipation, during, or after G's policy changes?

Support for violence indeed dropped in the public of Northern Ireland. There has been an overwhelming support in both Northern Ireland and the Republic of Ireland for decommissioning. The majority of people wanted the Good Friday Agreement to work.

According to a poll published on Belfast Telegraph on April 1, 1998, a majority of Protestants and Catholics held "a commitment to the principles of democracy and non-violence essential.38"

About a year after the Good Friday Agreement, another poll published on March 3, 1999, indicates that the majority of Northern Irelanders want the Belfast Agreement to work.39

People were asked to indicate which ones they considered to be very important, important, of some importance, of little importance or of no importance at all. The results are shown below. 40

In their research, Hayes and McAllister sent out a survey to gauge public support for political violence in 1999. According to their survey, 26% of respondents in Northern Ireland express some level of sympathy for republic paramilitaries, while 27% sympathize with loyalists.41 Both numbers are higher for respondents in Northern Ireland.42 The following tables show the results of the survey.

The following table shows the relationship between attitudes toward sympathy for paramilitaries and decommissioning.43 It shows an overwhelming support in both Northern Ireland and the Republic of Ireland for decommissioning regardless their sympathy level for paramilitary organizations.44

In October 2001, ICM conducted a poll based on a random sample of 1,004 adults aged 18 and over from across the Republic of Ireland. The main topic of the survey is on the political attitudes in the Republic of Ireland. The results show that 36% blamed the IRA for the

current failure of the peace process.45 83% believed that the IRA should decommission all its weapons, while 10% believed otherwise.46

On July 28, 2005, the IRA formally announced an end to its 36-year armed campaign. "All IRA units have been ordered to dump arms," the group says in a statement. "All volunteers have been instructed to assist the development of purely political and democratic programs through exclusively peaceful means. Volunteers must not engage in any other activities whatsoever.47" However, it still opposed what it calls an illegal foreign occupation of its country. Two IRA splinter groups, Real IRA and Continuity IRA, continue to practice terrorism.

6. If the answer to 3 is no and to 4 is yes: is there any evidence that G changed policy in order to undermine S's support for T?

Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam

1. Who is the targeted government G? Who is T? Who is S?

S1 - Domestic Tamils

Tamils are a minority in Singhalese-dominated Sri Lanka; just between 10% and 15% Burke (2010) of the population is Tamil. Following Sri Lankan independence from Britain in 1948, riots swept across Sri Lanka, targeting the Tamil minority. Moreover, the Sri Lankan Government (G) changed the official language to Sinhalese, neglecting the large Tamil minority. Under these actions perpetuated by the Sinhalese government, the Tamil people began calling for a separate state as the only viable means to ensure their rights. Among all the burgeoning Tamil rebel groups, the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (T) rose to prominence after killing other groups' leaders and commandeering their cadres.(200, 2009) *S2 – Tamils abroad*

According to Peter Chalk, "the majority of financial support comes from six main areas, all

of which contain large Tamil diasporas: Switzerland, Canada, Australia, the UK, the US, and Scandinavian countries." (Chalk, 1999) Legitimate Tamil business in other countries, in cohorts with NGOs, charities, and donors, were thought to provide annual income of $200-300 million, with exact proportional breakdowns of contributions across groups unknown. (Chalk, 2008)

S3 - Tamil United Liberation Front (TULF) in late 1970s

The TULF leader Appapillai Amirthalingam, who was elected in 1977 as the opposition leader of Sri Lankan Parliament, "clandestinely supported" the LTTE and "provided letters of reference to the LTTE and to other Tamil insurgent groups to raise funds." (Gunaratne, 1997) Amirthalingam's son cited him as a "forceful moderate," supporting his son's "taking up arms [but unsupportive of] ...targeting civilians." (Pathirana, 2010) The LTTE, however, was a less discriminatory offshoot of the TULF with regard to their predations on regular citizens. The TULF, itself, was merely a political group that publicly sought diplomatic means to reconcile the disparities between the Tamils and Sinhalese in Sri Lanka. However, another TULF parliamentarian, Chavakachcheri MP V.N. Navaratnam, supported the LTTE by introducing many wealthy overseas Tamils to the insurgent leaders. (Gunaratne, 1997)

S4 – Temporary Support from Premadasa (Sri Lankan) Government

Prime Minister Ranasinghe Premadasa pledged to withdraw the IPKF, which had been fighting back the LTTE, as soon as he was elected president during his election campaign in 1988: "When R. Premadasa became the President of Sri Lanka he forced the Indian Government to withdraw the IPKF from Sri Lanka." (Mohanasundram, 2008) The IPKF formally left the country in March 1990 upon the request of President Premadasa.(Mohanasundram, 2008)

2. What is the ideal outcome for T, and what is the ideal outcome for S?

Ideal Outcome for T

The LTTE sought to establish separate autonomous state called Tamil Eelam, which the

group saw as the only mechanism to protect Tamil rights. Feeling increasingly disenfranchised by the Sinhalese-majority government, the LTTE came together in 1975 and based itself out of northern and eastern parts of Sri Lanka. The LTTE even placed some of the civilian government employees on its payroll, believing that this operation in the government would facilitate a smooth transition to its own civilian leadership in Tamil Eelam. (200, 2009)

Ideal Outcome for Sri Lankan Tamils

Al Jazeera cites that "After 1948, the Tamils...became the targets of numerous riots that swept through the island nation. Believing that these riots were instigated by the Sinhalese authorities, Tamils began calling for an independent state." (200, 2009) According to Ahmed Hashim, the LTTE had "considerable support among the Tamil population," who knew the LTTE goal to be the establishment of a right to "self-determination." (Hashim, 2013) In other words, local Tamil supporters were prominent, understanding through propaganda distributed by the LTTE that it had designs on a separate state. However, over time, the Tamil people grew weary of brutal tactics employed by the LTTE, and merely began to desire the same rights afforded to the Sinhalese majority. These "rights" referred to ending discrimination in areas of culture, language, employment, freedom of speech, and freedom of association. (Burke, 2010)

A newspaper article following the downfall of the LTTE noted that "dozens of interviews in Jaffna reveal that few continue[d] to endorse the demand for a separate Tamil homeland, the key aim of the LTTE and one recently endorsed by a "referendum" of the Tamil-origin population overseas organised by activists." (Burke, 2010) The Sri Lankan Tamils, aside from their initially extreme aspirations, proved to be more moderate than those of the TO.

Ideal Outcome for Tamils abroad

Abroad, legitimate Tamil business greatly financed the LTTE during its existence. Even as vestiges of the now fallen LTTE, the Tamil diaspora largely supports a separate Tamil Eelam

Country	Yes (%)	No (%)
Norway (Tamilnet, 2009b)	>99	<1
France (Tamilnet, 2009a)	>99	<1
Canada (Tamilnet, 2009c)	>99	<1
Switzerland (Tamilnet, 2010g)	>99	<1
Germany (Tamilnet, 2010f)	>99	<1
Netherlands (Tamilnet, 2010a)	>99	<1
United Kingdom (Tamilnet, 2010e)	>99	<1
Denmark (Tamilnet, 2010c)	>98	<2
Italy (Tamilnet, 2010d)	>98	<2
Australia (Tamilnet, 2010b)	>99	<1

Table 1: "I aspire for the formation of the independent and sovereign state of Tamil Eelam in the north and east territory of the island of Sri Lanka on the basis that the Tamils in the island of Sri Lanka make a distinct nation, have a traditional homeland and have the right to self-determination."

for their Sri Lankan counterparts by available polling data.1 This data was gathered from 2009-2010 via several referendums, and it details the diaspora's support for a separate state across several countries where it features most prominently. This sharply contrasts with the feelings expressed by the Sri Lankan Tamils, whose support for the LTTE had since become relatively lukewarm. Sri Lankan Tamils had to bear the costs of the enduring struggle and now merely want reprieve. The International Crisis Group summarized the difference in sentiments well: "Nonetheless, most Tamils abroad remain profoundly committed to Tamil Eelam, the existence of a separate state in Sri Lanka. This has widened the gap between the diaspora and Tamils in Sri Lanka. Most in the country are exhausted by decades of war and are more concerned with rebuilding their lives under difficult circumstances than in continuing the struggle for an independent state. There is no popular support for a return to armed struggle. Without the LTTE to enforce a common political line, Tamil leaders in Sri Lanka are proposing substantial reforms within a united Sri Lanka. Unwilling to recognise the scale of defeat, and continuing to believe an independent state is possible, however, many diaspora leaders have dismissed Tamil politicians on the island either as traitors for working with the government or as too weak or scared to stand up for their people's rights."

Figure 3

Breakdown of Overall Deaths in the Conflict			
Category of those Killed	Sri Lanka War (1983-2009)	Iraq War (2004-09)	Afghanistan War (2001-14)
Friendly Force Personnel	29%	17%	29%
Enemy Force Personnel	37%	22%	46%
Civilians	34%	61%	25%

(International Crisis Group, 2010) To quantify relative civilian casualties, 34% of the war deaths were civilian. This made the war in Sri Lanka proportionally harder on the Sri Lankan Tamil population than the Afghanistan war, for reference, see Figure 3. The Tamils abroad who widely remain devoted to Tamil Eelam have equivalently radical goals to those of the LTTE, which differ from those of Sri Lankan Tamils.

Ideal Outcome for Tamil United Liberation Front

In the late 1970s, the TULF had goals aligning with the LTTE, as "[the TULF] officially called for the formation of an independent Tamil state in 1976." (Stanford University, b) In fact, the LTTE was originally a component of the TULF, and considered a "violent offshoot" emerging from the organization. (Stanford University, b) The TULF, on the other hand, was a political party representing the interests of the Tamils. They won a small amount of the seats in the Sri Lankan parliamentary election of 1977. (Government of Sri Lanka, 1977) The Leader of this organization, Appapillai Amirthalingam, "clandestinely supported" the LTTE. Though later becoming a target of LTTE attacks, the TULF had an ideal outcome equally radical to that of the LTTE.

Ideal Outcome for Premadasa Government

The ideal outcome of the Premadasa government had nothing to do with Tamil independence. Both the Sri Lankan Government and LTTE had the common interest of removing

the IPKF from within Sri Lankan borders, with Premadasa stating that "India was interfering with internal matters and browbeating a smaller neighbor." (Mohanasundram, 2008) Following the divergence of the two groups' interests when the IPKF finally left, Premadasa was assassinated by the LTTE and conflict resumed.

3. Did T achieve its ideal outcome?

The LTTE campaign was unsuccessful, per our definition; A separate state of Tamil Eelam was not established through its efforts. Some scholars consider it a "partial success" or "limited success" in that the LTTE gained temporary control over northern and eastern areas of Sri Lanka from 1990 onward. (Abrahms, 2006b) However, the duress from the LTTE failed to galvanize the government to create an autonomous state for the Tamils.

4. Did S achieve its ideal outcome? If not, did G change its policies in a way that moved at least partially toward S's ideal outcome? Was this change in policies closer to the ideal outcome of S or of T?

Throughout the duration of the conflict, the Sri Lankan government never fully granted the Tamil People a state; however, many concessions following a 2002 ceasefire were made. Given that the ultimate goal of the Sri Lankan Tamils (S1) had become an end to discrimination, these concessions fulfilled the relatively moderate goals of the TO's domestic supporters. The government allowed the LTTE to hold control in its established localities with non-demarcated areas being divided equally between LTTE and government control. (Government of Sri Lanka, 2002) Both parties also agreed to neutralize places of worship, to include temples, churches, mosques, etc. (Government of Sri Lanka, 2002) Also, the government halted arrests under the Prevention of Terrorism Act of 1979, Government of Sri Lanka (2002) which exclusively targeted Tamils. This represented a greater range of rights in personal autonomy, religious freedom, and freedom from profiling, all without granting a separate state.

This ceasefire, however, came to an end in 2004 when the first suicide attack since its signing

occurred. (Pradeep Raj, 2002) The government then struggled against the LTTE until its ultimate demise in 2009. This eliminated the possibility of the TULF (S3) and Tamil Diaspora (S2), who supported and still support, respectively, the ultimate goal of a separate state of Tamil Eelam (see Figure 2). Today, the situation has only partially moved toward the ideal outcome for Sri Lankan Tamils. Much of the population remains displaced from the war, and the Sri Lankan military controls and monitors Tamil-dominated areas as "high-security zones." (Anandakugan, 2020) It should be noted, however, that the military patrols these areas less intensely than when it was fighting the LTTE. Other signs of "Sinhalization," which is the suppression or erasure of Tamil culture in favor of Sinhalese, persist through the establishment of Sinhalese monuments, signs and street names, and Buddhist temples in Tamil-majority areas. (Anandakugan, 2020)

5. If the answer to 3 is no and to 4 is yes: did S's support for T decline in anticipation, during, or after G's policy changes?

Support declined throughout government policy changes, but only with certain groups. Much of the factors contributing to the LTTE's downfall came in the wake of the ceasefire in the form of diminishing support. According to Grand Strategy expert, Peter Layton, "Only 12 percent of Sri Lanka's population were Lankan Tamils and of these it was believed that only some 300,000 actively supported the LTTE. Moreover, the LTTE's legitimacy as an organization was declining. By 2006, the LTTE relied on conscription – not volunteers – to fill its ranks and many of these were children." (Layton, 2015)

By virtue of the "quietude" between the LTTE and Sri Lankan government, the LTTE shifted its focus internally, magnifying problems that had, until then, been dampened by the cooperative struggle against the common external enemy of the Sri Lankan government. (Moorthy, 2004) Karuna Amman, a Colonel in the LTTE and the leader of the Eastern Tamils within the LTTE, instigated a schism between the Northern and Eastern Tamils. "Sri Lanka's northern Tamils have always thought of themselves as superior, within the LTTE hierarchy,

to the eastern Tamils, and this has naturally created resentment among the eastern cadres...in recent years the predominance of some high caste Tamils of the northern district within the leadership structure of the LTTE has resulted in problems with the eastern Tamils led by Karuna, who has been demanding the removal of such leaders." (Jayasekara, 2004) Karuna thus broke from the LTTE, taking his 6000 Layton (2015) troops with him. All of this to say, that more than external supporters—even support within the LTTE itself—began to wane when the government conceded enough to spur a ceasefire. The government promptly took advantage of this crucial divide and employed Karuna with his troops to swiftly dismantle the remaining LTTE combatants. (Herath, 2009) In this way, the TO partially disbanded itself following government policy changes but still required extra momentum to extinguish the remaining faction of Northern LTTE combatants.

Another reason for which Karuna parted with the LTTE came directly as a product of the policy change offered to the LTTE by the Sri Lankan government. During an interview, Karuna relayed his experience at the fifth round of peace talks with Norway. The Sri Lankan government strictly conveyed to him that the state of Tamil Eelam would never be accepted, but they offered him a more moderate "federal system with autonomy for the North East." (Liyanage and Amman, 2017) Karuna signed the agreement, to the dismay of the LTTE leader, Prabhakaran, whose extreme aspirations would only tolerate a separate state. The LTTE leader then berated him, which played a significant role in Karuna's decision to part with the LTTE and work with the Sri Lankan government. (Liyanage and Amman, 2017) In other words, the moderate yet conceding policy offered by the government undermined the support even within the terrorist organization.

Support from Tamils abroad for the LTTE remained strong until its dissolution. The LTTE largely depended on financial support from the Tamil diaspora throughout its entire existence, with 80-90 percent Becker (2005) of the LTTE's military funding coming from diaspora and foreign investments. Some of these funding networks are in place today. In fact, even

following a war, many within the diaspora still support the initial radical LTTE goal of establishing an autonomous state (see Figure 2). The contemporary Tamil diaspora instead opts for democratic means of achieving a state, despite a large amount of its constituents preferring an LTTE armed struggle. Some of the diaspora even denounces its Sri Lankan counterparts as traitors for abandoning the dream of Tamil Eelam. Much of the diaspora saw the LTTE as the only group to gain them respect, a sentiment that garnered support abroad and endures today. (International Crisis Group, 2010) Even in 2009, the year of the LTTE's demise, a poll in the Indian state of Tamil Nadu showed that 66 percent The New India Express (2009) of respondents agreed that the Indian government should back the LTTE. This appears to be a microcosm of the diaspora at large, similar to the polling data 1.

6. If the answer to 3 is no and to 4 is yes: is there any evidence that G changed policy in order to undermine S's support for T?

Yes. Abroad, the government merely cut off LTTE access to its diaspora support network through diplomatic means. Domestically, the most striking loss of support occurred as a product of Colonel Karuna splitting from the LTTE, bringing with him thousands of cadres. During an interview Karuna recounted his specific motivations for breaking ties with LTTE leader, Prabhakaran: "I was in Norway for the fifth round of peace talks...Somewhere in the discussion Minister Peiris said, 'This is the fifth round of talks. We meet and talk and nothing progresses. First thing is you have to give up the Tamil Eelam dream. The world won't accept it, including India. The Sri Lankan government said it will offer a federal system with autonomy for the North-east.'" (Liyanage and Amman, 2017) In other words, the Sri Lankan government saved face through the pretense of "not granting independence," while offering Tamil "autonomy." They offered a moderate policy change to achieve peace. Karuna proved receptive toward this rather moderate deal responding: "this is really a good offer...the world has changed a lot after September 11th. All western countries are against terrorists and we

are on the terrorist list, even India has done that. The federal system is good for our people. If we continue to come for peace talks yet nothing moves forward, the world will get tired of us." (Liyanage and Amman, 2017) Karuna signed the agreement, understanding that this concession from the government provided him a way out of the enduring violence, which had lost favor with many already.

Prabhakaran, however, responded with hostility toward the signing of the agreement, retaining the LTTE's extremist precepts. (Liyanage and Amman, 2017) This severed Col. Karuna from the rest of the LTTE. When Prabhakaran ordered Karuna to send 4,000 soldiers from the East, Karuna again refused, arguing that "a majority of soldiers were young." Verbatim, Karuna said, "A bird in the hand is worth two in the bush. We are not going to send soldiers." (Liyanage and Amman, 2017) In other words, Karuna considered it better to settle for a more moderate deal than risk taking more, and so did other Tamils. Al Jazeera also conducted an interview with Karuna, corroborating Prabhakaran's aversion to moderate concessions. When asked to "share his insights on Prabhakaran," Karuna responded that "[Prabhakaran] has a totalitarian policy. He never changes from that policy, he totally believes that policy. He never accepts any other's ideas, he never appreciates intellectuals." (Al Jazeera and Amman, 2009) Ultimately, according to Karuna in this interview, "The government gave [Prabhakaran] a lot of chance to [participate] in democracy but he always refused. The government then took [the] decision to destroy him." (Al Jazeera and Amman, 2009) According to Karuna, the "East that bore the brunt of the war." (Liyanage and Amman, 2017) He felt underappreciated by Prabhakaran, and quickly took the deal.

Karuna later convened with "educated people including university lecturers and doctors," explaining what had precipitated and that this was the best deal offered by the Sri Lankan government. "Most of those who came supported my views. Some were not in favour because this would mean giving up the dream of Tamil Eelam." (Liyanage and Amman, 2017) This marked the difference emerging in the new guard and the unyielding old guard. Later

on, Karuna's change of allegiance and the domestic supporters he brought with him would become instrumental to the LTTE's defeat. At the crux of this crucial decision rested the small, carefully engineered concession from Sri Lanka that appealed to moderate Tamils' designs.

In an interview conducted by Frontline, Karuna quantified the weight of his departure from the LTTE, citing that it "[could not] function without [him]" since he provided "75% of the strength" with "fighters," "techniques," and "technology." (Sambandan and Amman, 2004) After Karuna left the LTTE, he said in the interview that even the LTTE leader had finally given up the desire for a separate state. Karuna noted that "We will not get a separate country. That is out of question...We can negotiate a settlement with a government that comes to power." (Sambandan and Amman, 2004) This negotiated settlement did, in fact offer auspicious concessions to Karuna and his followers through representation in government.

The Sri Lankan government decided to appoint Karuna to the "Minister of Integration," Reddy (2009) thus solidifying him in a political position and giving Tamils a political voice. In the same breath, the then Presidential Secretariat said that Karuna had brought with him many LTTE Cadre from the East and at least 1,750 Tamil men and women. (Reddy, 2009) This arguably cuts in favor of the government's capitalization on concessions to Tamils to dissipate LTTE support. Karuna had also been offered positions in parliament, which humans rights organizations condemned. Sam Zarifi, Asia Pacific Director for Amnesty International remarked: "Karuna should stand trial...The fact that a suspected war criminal should be entering Parliament sends an appalling message – that war crimes, rather than being investigated and punished, are actually rewarded. It also contributes to endemic impunity, which has characterised the approach of all parties to the conflict for decades." (Amnesty International, 2008) Human Rights Watch also implored the UN Security Council to "publicly condemn the Sri Lankan government for failing to investigate cases of child abduction and recruitment in government-controlled territory, and the complicity of its security forces in abductions by the Karuna group." (**?**) Arguably, Sri Lanka's "failure" to investigate Karuna's war crimes traces back to the 1,750

Reddy (2009) Tamils and thousands of cadres he brought with him; The government's ignorance for his war crimes–even despite international disapproval–is indicative of how necessary the policy change of offering a former Tamil terrorist political appointment was. Garnering support from more moderate Tamils and Karuna's supporters, who would otherwise align with the LTTE, was of utmost importance to the Sri Lankan government.

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